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Introduction 
This study traces the genesis and evolution of the right to development [RTD] from its post-
colonial conception through its more than 30 years struggle for recognition and implementation 
as a human right in the present day. It examines the substantive legal content of the right and 
considers different geo-political and geo-economic influences which shaped and continue to 
shape contemporary debate on RTD. It emphasizes that because Westphalian and western-
liberal order value systems have both contributed to the reasons for Southern countries needing 
to promote RTD in the first place, and to shaping the fundamental disagreements and debates 
which ensued directly following its declaration by the United Nations General Assembly in 1986 
as an inalienable human right of every human person and all peoples, further and inclusive inter-
regional (civilisations) dialogue on RTD is necessary for any meaningful progress to be made 
towards its formal codification and implementation at the global level. The study argues that 
Southern and Eastern values and proposals regarding RTD differ in some key respects from those 
of the dominant Westphalian-forged West but must be considered on an equal footing as a 
prerequisite to attaining agreement on common approaches on how to proceed beyond the 
existing impasse.  
The body of the paper examines the direct connection between implementing RTD, the types of 
rights-based systems operating in different parts of the world and the economic policies these 
generate to shape the lives and well-being of people across the globe. The West, de facto if not 
always in discourse, favours  prioritizing civil and political rights, while Russia, China and many 
Asian States [East] seek to do the very opposite, placing focus on realizing economic, social and 
cultural rights, often emphasizing RTD as the most important right. Many countries of the South 
seem caught in a whirlwind of different approaches and ever-mounting foreign-debt from failure 
of or overburden from unsuited development policies which have denied individuals and peoples 
access to RTD. In parallel, the post-WWII global governance architecture based on the UN Charter 
and Bretton Woods Institutions is under pressure to transform in order to keep pace with a 
globalization where international economic law and management resist the constraints of the 
Westphalian sovereign-state paradigm which defines the positive international public and private 
law of today.  
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The study then examines the emerging multi-polarity of world order, including a New 
International Economic Order [NIEO], which will guide the future of RTD, and identifies the rivalry 
between the United States and China as a key civilizational relation regarding the future of RTD 
and global economics. It concludes by recognizing that action on implementing RTD is needed on 
all human rights fronts, i.e. the codification of a Framework Treaty on RTD, strengthening the 
implementation and accountability of RTD through existing international law provisions which 
contribute to RTD, and most essentially through enhanced dialogue and engagement which 
focuses on all of these issues. There can be no winners per se – the United States, China and all 
nations will win or lose together. 
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The Right to Development [RTD] within Human Rights 
 
On 4 December 1986, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Right 
to Development [RTD] by a majority vote of 146 to 1 against with 8 abstentions.1 In its preamble 
and ten (10) articles, the Declaration affirms many of the fundamental principles in the UN 
Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights [UDHR]. These include international 
peace and security, international cooperation for development, the recognition that all human 
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights and that all have the right to a standard of 
living adequate for their well-being, the right to self-determination of peoples, and the right to a 
social and international order in which the rights and freedoms proclaimed in the Universal 
Declaration can be fully realized for all people everywhere without discrimination.2  
 
The Right to Development [RTD] is defined as:  
Article 1 
 
1.  The right to development is an inalienable human right by virtue of which every human 
person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, 
social, cultural and political development, in which all human rights and fundamental 
freedoms can be fully realized.  
 
2.  The human right to development also implies the full realization of the right of peoples to 
self- determination, which includes, subject to the relevant provisions of both International 
Covenants on Human Rights, the exercise of their inalienable right to full sovereignty over 
all their natural wealth and resources.3 
 
                                                          
1 UN Declaration on the Right to Development, UN Resolution 41/128, 4 December, 1986 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/41/a41r128.htm; The United States voted against the Declaration while 
Denmark, Finland, Federal Republic of Germany, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Sweden and the United Kingdom abstained.  
2 United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights [UNHCHR], Frequently Asked Questions on the Right to 
Development, Fact Sheet No. 37 at: https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FSheet37_RtD_EN.pdf  
3 Idem note 1, see Declaration, Article 1  
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RTD is not codified in global international law but is enshrined regionally: (i) in Article 22, African 
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, the only hard law document bestowing a RTD, binding 
and enforceable on States.  Article 22 is explicit in that the subject holders of the right are 
“peoples” and not individuals and the significance of that distinction continues to be debated;4 
(ii) Article 37 Arab Charter on Human Rights gives “every citizen has the right to participate in the 
realization of development and to enjoy the benefits and fruits thereof”.  RTD is also re-affirmed 
in an array of global and regional soft law instruments including most notably, the earlier 1974 
Declaration on the Establishment of a New the International Economic Order [NIEO] and the 
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States of the same year. It was subsequently 
announced, inter alia, in the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development and the 
1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action among others.5 This body of soft law together 
                                                          
4African Charter On Human And Peoples Rights, at: http://www.achpr.org/instruments/achpr/ ; 
 
“ Article 22: 
 
1. All peoples shall have the right to their economic, social and cultural development with due regard to their 
freedom and identity and in the equal enjoyment of the common heritage of mankind. 
 
2. States shall have the duty, individually or collectively, to ensure the exercise of the right to development.”  
 
See also Karin Arts, Atabongawung Tamo, 2016, The Right to Development in International Law: New Momentum 
Thirty Years Down the Line? Neth Int Law Rev (2016) 63:221–249, DOI 10.1007/s40802-016-0066-x; And at above 
note 2, UNHCHR Fact Sheet No. 37, Chapter 27, “A regional perspective: article 22 of the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights” Obiora Chinedu Okafor, Section III. Who are the right holders contemplated by article 22? pages 
378-380 which highlights the importance of the collective nature of the right despite that the actual Declaration on 
RTD announces and individual and collective right.   
5 League of Arab States, Arab Charter on Human Rights, May 22, 2004, reprinted in 12 Int'l Hum. Rts. Rep. 893 (2005), 
entered into force March 15, 2008.  
 
“Article 37  
 
The right to development is a fundamental human right and all States are required to establish the development 
policies and to take the measures needed to guarantee this right. They have a duty to give effect to the values of 
solidarity and cooperation among them and at the international level with a view to eradicating poverty and 
achieving economic, social, cultural and political development. By virtue of this right, every citizen has the right to 
participate in the realization of development and to enjoy the benefits and fruits thereof.” 
 
See also Idem note 2, page 24 – Reaffirmed, inter alia, in the Millennium Declaration, the 2002 Monterrey Consensus 
of the International Conference on Financing for Development; the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, the 
2004 ASEAN Human Rights Declaration; the 2007 Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples the 1994 Cairo 
Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development; the 1995 Copenhagen 
Declaration on Social Development and Programme of Action of the World Summit for Social Development and the 
1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, Fourth World Conference on Women. 
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with its albeit limited codification has however given RTD instrumental value in introducing 
human rights norms and standards into global governance, and into advocacy for effecting 
reforms in national and international policies.6  
 
Following the adoption of the Declaration RTD, the UN Commission on Human Rights [CHR] and 
Human Rights Council [HRC] set up structures on RTD including an open-ended 
intergovernmental working group [still active today] assisted first by an Independent Expert 
(1988–2004), and later by a High-Level Task Force (HLTF, 2004–2010), to monitor and review its 
implementation. In 2010, the HLTF defined a “core norm” of RTD as “the right of peoples and 
individuals to the constant improvement of their well-being and to a national and global 
environment conducive to just, equitable, participatory and human-centered development 
respectful of all human rights”.7 
In 1994, the UN created the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights with a mandate 
inter alia: 
1. Reaffirming the right to development is a universal and inalienable right which is a 
fundamental part of the rights of the human person; 
2. Deciding, inter alia,  that the High Commissioner for Human Rights shall:  
a. recognize the importance of promoting a balanced and sustainable development for 
all people and of ensuring realization of the right to development, as established in 
the Declaration on the Right to Development; 
                                                          
6 Fukuda-Parr S (2012), The right to development: reframing a new discourse for the twenty-first century, Soc Res 
Int Q 79:839–864 (2012), p. 857 at: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40802-016-0066-x ; Landmark 
evolutions pertaining to the RTD are also contained, among many others, in the 1960 Declaration on the Granting of 
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples , the 1961, 1970 and 1980 Programmes for the United Nations 
Development Decades; The 1968 Proclamation of Teheran International Conference on Human Rights.  
7A/HRC/15/WG.2/TF/2/Add.2, 8 March 2010, 8 at: http://undocs.org/A/HRC/15/WG.2/TF/2/Add.2; It also identified 
three attributes of this core norm: (i) comprehensive and human-centered development policy; (ii) participatory 
human rights processes; (iii) social justice in development. 
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b. be responsible to promote and protect the realization of the right to development 
and to enhance support from relevant bodies of the United Nations system for this 
purpose.8 
Most recently, in 2016, the HRC appointed a Special Rapporteur on the RTD with a broad 
mandate including: “contributing to the promotion, protection and fulfilment of the right to 
development in the context, among others, of the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, the Addis Ababa 
Action Agenda of the Third International Conference on Financing for Development and the Paris 
Agreement on climate change…”9 Yet this seemingly positive evolution belies the reality that RTD 
has had an unstable footing from its conception where even today, its birth is seen by many, 
notably western neo-liberal lobbies, to be illegitimate.  
 
Marks and Malhotra trace the genesis of RTD back to Senegalese Judge Kéba M’Baye who in 1971 
in a UN lecture was the first to propose that development be defined as a human right.10 In 1977, 
Senegal as chair at the then Commission on Human Rights [CHR] requested a study on “the 
international dimensions of the right to development.”11 In response, the UN Secretariat 
produced a study in 1979 which provided the basis for the 1986 UN Declaration on RTD and 
anticipated the major challenge of how to translate the concept of RTD “into a notion capable of 
providing practical guidance and inspiration, based on international human rights standards, in 
                                                          
8 A/RES/48/141, 7 January 1994, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly at: 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/48/a48r141.htm  [on the report of the Third Committee (A/48/632/Add.4)] 
High Commissioner for the promotion and protection of all human rights.   
9 A/HRC/RES/33/14 - Resolution adopted by the Human Rights Council on 29 September 2016 at: 
http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?si=A/HRC/33/L.29  The right to development. Adopted by a 
recorded vote of 34 [NAM countries] to 2 [France and the UK], with 11 abstentions. The Special Rapporteur reports 
annually to the HRC and the General Assembly. 
10 Stephen Marks and Rajeev Malhotra, 2017, The future of the right to development, Harvard University at: 
https://cdn1.sph.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/134/2018/06/Marks-Malhotra-The-Future-of-the-Right-
to-Development-2017.pdf; See footnote 3 on Kéba M’Baye, “Le Droit au Développement Comme un Droit de 
L’Homme, Leçon inaugurale de la Troisième Session d’enseignement de l’Institut International des droits de 
l’Homme, Revue des droits de l’homme, vol. 5 (1972), 503. 
11 Idem - Senegal made the request in a manner as if the RTD already existed, and that it just needed some 
clarification. 
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the context of development activities.”12 The international climate of the time was characterized 
by the post WWII progressive codification of human rights within an ideologically and politically 
charged cold-war global order. “The Economist” reminds us that the capitalist West was keener 
on Civil and Political Rights [CPR] while the Soviet Union and states aligned with it prioritized 
Economic Social and Cultural Rights [ESCR], a difference which determined the need for two 
separate instruments, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [ICCPR]13 and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [ICESCR],14 neither of which 
included RTD.15   
 
Zalta, Nodelman, Allen and Anderson explain, people and States are “enormously varied in their 
practices, traditions, religions, and levels of economic and political development” while human 
rights hard and soft law and activism prescribe universal standards in these same areas.16 Noting 
tension between the approach of “Relativism” i.e. that standards for a particular country or 
region are mostly shaped by the traditions, beliefs, and conditions of that country or region, 
versus the “Universalist” approach i.e. those holding a philosophically-inclined set of standards 
and values to human rights activism, they highlight alerts issued at the time, that the UDHR would 
be seen to represent Western-European and American values and warned that “what is held to 
                                                          
12 Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc E.CN.4/1334, 2 January 1979 at: 
https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/6652/files/E_CN.4_1334-EN.pdf  The international dimensions of the right to 
development as a human right in relation with other human rights based on international cooperation, including 
the right to peace, taking into account the requirement of the New International Economic Order and the 
fundamental human needs.  
13International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 19 December 1966, at 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%20999/volume-999-i-14668-english.pdf   
14 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,16 December,1 966 at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CESCR.aspx  
15 Economist - Human rights:  Righting wrongs - Human-rights campaigners are starting to lobby for economic and 
social rights, such as the right to health and the right to food. Will they make a success of it? Aug 16th 2001 | NEW 
YORK at https://www.economist.com/node/739385;  See also UNOHCHR Fact Sheet No.2 (Rev.1) on The 
International Bill of Human Rights at: http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet2Rev.1en.pdf  - 
The “International Bill of Rights” was bolstered by seven other  core human rights treaties covering fundamental 
rights and freedoms, none of which codify a specific RTD. The USSR-led socialist bloc favored initiatives on peace 
and disarmament while former colonies pushed for attention to development, non-discrimination and the 
contemporary struggle against apartheid. Western countries however focused on violations of civil and political 
rights [CPR] and avoided commitments to economic, social and cultural rights [ESCR].  
16 Zalta, Nodelman, Allen and Anderson - Human Rights, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2014 at: 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/rights-human/  See section 4. Universal Human Rights in a 
World of Diverse Beliefs and Practices pages 34-35.  
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be a human right in one society may be regarded as anti-social by another people.”17 Lukina 
points out the universalist outreach of the UDHR faced major obstacles in countries such as the 
Soviet Union which abstained during the UDHR’s adoption. She notes the Soviet approach 
favored State guaranteed socio-economic rights which conflicted with free market values and 
enterprise. These East-West UDHR relations in 1948 represented “a kind of trade-off between 
personal rights and economic rights.” In this environment, Africa became a significant force 
within the Non-Aligned Movement [NAM] and the Group of 77 developing countries [G77] policy 
formulation18   
 
Africa’s role was aided by the 1981 OAU’s African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights which, 
D'Sa, notes, was distinguished by its innovative provisions recognizing rights both of individuals 
                                                          
17 Idem - referring to the American Anthropological Association Statement on Human Rights 1947 at 
https://lucian.uchicago.edu/blogs/around1948/files/2012/09/1947-Statement-on-Human-Rights-American-
Anthropological-Association.pdf  
18  Alden C., Morphet S., Vieira M.A. (2010) The Non-Aligned Movement and Group of 77 During the Cold War, 
1965–89. In: The South in World Politics. Palgrave Macmillan, London at: 
https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9780230281196_3; See also Anna Lukina, Soviet Union and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Max Planck Institute for European Legal History Research Paper Series No. 
2017-01 Conclusions at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2952292 – go to Introduction, and 
section on “The Soviet Approach Summed Up”. See also: (i)  The International Dimensions Of Human Rights, Karel 
Vasak, 1982, Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut - UNESCO, Paris - See “Historical Foundations of Human 
Rights and Subsequent Developments” by Imre Sxabo on page 26, at: 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0005/000562/056230Eo.pdf  Szabo notes that ESCR in the UDHR are referred 
to only in passing reflecting a broader trend in the evolution of international human rights law. Reflecting this 
posture, the 1950 European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of the 
Council of Europe [COE] included only a few SE rights, and focused on CP rights – ECHR Blog at 
http://echrblog.blogspot.com/2008/10/social-and-economic-rights-and-echr.html ; (ii) The European Convention 
on Human Rights: A-Socio-Economic Rights Charter? Liam Thornton at:  
http://researchrepository.ucd.ie/bitstream/handle/10197/6132/Chapter_Fourteen_The_ECHR_A_SER_Charter.
docx.pdf?sequence=1 ; (iii) European Social Charter of 1961 at https://www.coe.int/en/web/turin-european-
social-charter. The Charter is the counterpart of the European Convention on Human Rights in the sphere of 
economic and social rights. Taken together with the ECHR, they provide a comprehensive positive legal framework 
to ensure protection of all human rights; (iii) The Americas stayed with the UDHR and ECHR approach in 1969 in 
adopting the OAS American Convention on Human Rights. This regional instrument again focused on CP rights save 
for article 26 which committed States Parties to adopt measures to “progressively achieve, the full realization of  
economic, social, educational, scientific, and cultural standards set forth in the OAS Charter” - and the pre-UDHR 
1948 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. See: American Convention On Human Rights - 
Adopted At The Inter-American Specialized Conference On Human Rights, San José, Costa Rica, 22 November 1969 
at https://www.cidh.oas.org/basicos/english/basic3.american%20convention.htm See also Christina M. Cerna, 
Reflections On The Normative Status Of The American Declaration Of The Rights And Duties Of Man - 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/tablas/r31598.pdf             
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and the rights of peoples. The latter included the rights to self-determination, to freely dispose 
of natural wealth and resources and crucially, individual and peoples’ right to development [RTD]. 
The Charter also imposed on States “the duty, individually or collectively, to ensure the exercise 
of the right to development.”19 Developing countries then supported Senegal’s initiative to have 
the UN declare development itself a human right. As champion of the approach, the NAM / G77 
with a majority in the UNGA sought to promote RTD as a right itself, and as a “normative basis 
and… blueprint for the creation of a more just international economic order.”20  
 
This strategic push by NAM/G77 was meant to get the strongest economies of the Western-North 
to accept greater responsibility for, and directly contribute more to, eliminating the causes of 
poverty and improving trade terms in favour of developing countries. However, the North was 
opposed and conceded only that a moral commitment to human development was acceptable. 
They would not entertain any legal obligation to transfer resources from North to South or to 
codify any specifics of the Declaration on the RTD to impose such legal obligations which the 
NAM countries favoured, a tension which continues today.21 The Western-Northern response 
typified by Regan and Thatcher advocated liberal economics which combined philosophical and 
economic free-market and monetarist theories of Fredrick Hayek, who advocated “competition, 
markets and prices as… ordering principles”, and Milton Friedman whose monetary policy held 
that prices in an economy are dictated by the supply of money where the State should create 
conditions for the free market to function, but not regulate it as such.22 Both philosophies 
                                                          
19African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, Adopted Nairobi June 27, 1981 at 
http://www.achpr.org/instruments/achpr/; See also Rose D'Sa, R. (1985). Human and Peoples′ Rights: Distinctive 
Features of the African Charter. Journal of African Law, 29(1), 72-81. doi:10.1017/S0021855300005635 
20United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 3201 (S-Vi) - Declaration on the Establishment of a New 
International Economic Order at https://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2775 ; see also 
Res 3202 (S-Vi) Plan of Action. 
21 Idem note 10 (Marks and Malhotra 2017) on page 3, referring to Regan and Thatcher who “under no 
circumstances would…allow a text to come out of the committee that would either affirm any legal obligation to 
transfer resources from North to South or codify any specifics regarding any of the issues contained in the 
declaration.” 
22 Fredrick Hayek See: Monetarism, By Bennett T. McCallum at: 
https://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/Monetarism.html; and Milton Friedman 1912-2006 at: 
https://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/bios/Friedman.html; Hayek held that markets guaranteed individual liberty 
to human beings and that any interference from the State in markets disrupted that liberty. Friedman believed the 
role of the State was to create the environment for the Free market to function but not to regulate it as such. 
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opposed Keynesian economic theory which insisted on some State intervention to create 
demand.23  
 
Not until 2012 did the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) adopt its Human Rights 
Declaration which included specific provisions on RTD.24  However, the Declaration was met with 
concern by the UN and human rights organizations for its lack of commitment to protect human 
rights as opposed to just promoting them.25 Others like Mahbubani defended ASEAN 
particularism and questioned the real universality of human rights in the first place, favouring an 
Asian-style approach where economic development is seen as a prerequisite for, and enabler of, 
respect for human rights to happen.26 Despite this North-South-East divergence on universality 
and priority of human rights and whether the person or the community should be their focus, 
the 1993 Vienna Declaration and Plan of Action saw unanimous global acknowledgment that RTD 
and all ESCR and CPR rights are universal, inalienable and an integral part of fundamental human 
rights. 27 It further affirmed the significance of different national and regional historical, cultural 
and religious particularities but declared that States have the duty to promote and protect all 
                                                          
23 Thatcher is famously described as fetching out a copy of Hayek’s “The Constitution of Liberty” from her bag and 
slamming it down on the table, declaring "this is what we believe". See: Thatcher, Hayek & Friedman at: 
https://www.margaretthatcher.org/archive/Hayek.asp  
24 ASEAN Human Rights Declaration at: 
https://www.asean.org/storage/images/ASEAN_RTK_2014/6_AHRD_Booklet.pdf ; see Right to Development 
paragraphs 35-37 
25 Asean Beat: Human Rights Declaration Falls Short at: https://thediplomat.com/2012/11/human-rights-
declaration-falls-short/ See also Stephen Hopgood: The Endtimes of Human Rights – See  Changing perspectives on 
human rights - Debating The Endtimes of Human Rights - Activism and Institutions in a Neo-Westphalian World, 
edited by Doutje Lettinga & Lars van Troost at: 
https://www.amnesty.nl/content/uploads/2016/12/debating_the_endtimes_of_human_rights.pdf ; Hopgood 
states that the ASEAN Declaration “allows public order and public morality concerns to trump rights by mimicking 
language in the UDHR”  
26 Mahbubani, Kishore, Can Asians Think?, 3rd edn (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Editions, 2004) at 85 – See 
generally The ASEAN Human Rights System: A Critical Analysis, Asian Journal of Comparative Law, Volume 11, Issue 
1, July 2016, pp. 111-140 That is, a developing society must first succeed in economic development before it can 
attain the social and political freedoms to be found in developed societies. See Google Scholar at: 
https://scholar.google.com/scholar_lookup?title=Can+Asians+Think?&publication+year=2004&author=MAHBUBA
NI+Kishore   
27  Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action Resolution at: 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/Vienna.aspx  
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human rights and fundamental freedoms regardless of different political, economic and cultural 
systems of governance.28     
 
RTD and the New International Economic Order [NIEO]  
 
Early 1960s international development policies were guided by “law and development” theory, 
nowadays recast as “good governance”. This approach sought the westernization of Third-World 
legal systems as a key prerequisite to, and catalyst for, development. The benefits of increased 
equality, freedom and participation based on respect for CPR would in turn foster improved 
material standards of living and all benefits would then "trickle down" to the poorest of the poor 
in society.29 However, as Southern countries emerged from colonialism and began to analyze 
their own post-colonial legacies, many Southern leaders and elites turned to “Dependency 
Theory” which refuted the neoclassical free market trickle-down idea and instead held the 
Northern capitalist system was responsible for underdevelopment in Southern countries. They 
saw exploitation of cheap Southern labor and resources to supply a one way market in the North, 
with no correlated socio-economic development in the South. Dependency theorists emphasized 
social indicators more than economic ones and pursued policies of self-reliance in contrast to the 
neo-classical models promoted by the International Monetary Fund [IMF] and the World Bank  
[WB]30 There was also a growing drive to press the North to take responsibility for abuses in 
                                                          
28 Idem note 27 - see paragraphs 1, 5 and 10; This was followed in 2005 by the UN World Summit which declared 
the universality of all human rights and fundamental freedoms, as interlinked, mutually reinforcing, universal and 
indivisible core values and principles of the UN - Resolution A/RES/60/1 adopted by the General Assembly on 16 
September, 2005, World Summit Outcome at 
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A_RES_60
_1.pdf   
29 Ruth E. Gordon and Jon H. Sylvester, Deconstructing Development, 22 Wis. Int'l. L. J. 1 (2004) pages 18-21 
30 Theories of Economic Development, G. Dang and L. Sui Pheng, Infrastructure Investments in Developing 
Economies, DOI 10.1007/978-981-287-248-7_2 © Springer Science+Business Media Singapore 2015, page 18. This 
theory is considered an extension of Marxist theory (citing Hein 1992). The poor countries are said to be dependent 
on the developed countries for markets and capital. However, developing countries received a very small portion of 
the benefits that the dependent relationship brought about. The unequal exchange, in terms of trade against poor 
countries, made free trade a convenient vehicle of “exploitation” for the developed countries.   
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theSouth and the South was forcefully demanding a New International Economic Order [NIEO] in 
this mindset. The RTD was championed by the G77 as an offspring of these NIEO efforts.31      
 
The 1974 Declaration on NIEO proposed by the South through United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development [UNCTAD] promoted Southern interests through increasing 
development assistance, reducing tariffs and improving terms of trade with the North.32 NIEO 
was meant to revise or replace the post 1945 Bretton Woods, broadly described, “Westphalian 
system” which the South saw as benefitting Western States, notably the US that created it.  
Interestingly, the Bretton Woods system had also faltered and in 1971, President Nixon broke 
from the dollar gold standard set in 1944.33 The G77 / NAM pushed ahead with NIEO and by 1974 
had negotiated strong moral and righteous language into the adopted NIEO Declaration which 
sought to rectify historic and ongoing wrongs perpetrated by the North on the South.34  
 
In 1975, Hudes described the flurry of international activity which energized support to NIEO 
including the Lomé Convention between the EU and ACP states, and North South Dialogues of 
the UNGA. However, the United States did not want structural change in the Bretton Woods 
                                                          
31Adeoye Akinsanya and Arthur Davies (1984), Third World Quest for a New International Economic Order: An 
Overview - The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 1, pp. 208-217 at: 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/759614?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents See introduction and generally.  
32 Idem note 20 [Declaration NIEO]    
33 Nixon Ends Convertibility of US Dollars to Gold and Announces Wage/Price Controls August 1971 at: 
https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/gold_convertibility_ends; [The gold standard was calculated at one 
dollar = 1/35th ounce of gold] See also: Forbes 2011: Nixon's Colossal Monetary Error: The Verdict 40 Years Later at: 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/charleskadlec/2011/08/15/nixons-colossal-monetary-error-the-verdict-40-years-
later/#77d6629d69f7 This interestingly coincided with US President Nixon’s claim in 1971 that Bretton Woods 
system had faltered due to international speculation against the US dollar and a run on gold and accordingly he 
broke  from the Gold Standard set in 1944 though the US dollar would remain the World Reserve Currency for a time 
to come;  Why and how did USD remain the world reserve currency after Nixon ended the gold standard and Bretton 
Woods System? at: https://www.quora.com/Why-and-how-did-USD-remain-the-world-reserve-currency-after-
Nixon-ended-the-gold-standard-and-Bretton-Woods-System  
34 Idem note 20 [NIEO], Resolution Para 4, e. The Declaration spoke of assisting developing countries, peoples under 
colonial alien domination, foreign occupation, racial discrimination or apartheid subjected to economic, political or 
other coercive measures to obtain subordination and secure advantages through neo colonialism by trying to get 
control over natural resources and economic activities; See also -  Ruth Gordon, (2009),The Dawn of a New, New 
International Economic Order, 72 Law and Contemporary Problems 131-162     at: 
https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/lcp/vol72/iss4/7  - Gordon notes that “Third World nations and peoples 
demanded a New International Economic Order (NIEO), endorsed by the United Nations…which would provide 
them, inter alia, permanent sovereignty over their natural resources and more control over their economic destiny.   
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order and encouraged negotiations between North and South to focus on adjusting the existing 
system.35 And if the South was envisaging its future through the prism of Dependency Theory, or 
even if some more progressive Southern leaders sought the middle ground of “embedded 
liberalism”, the Western-North was fast tracking neo-liberal free market economics against its 
ideological foe of socialism and communism in the cold-war USSR-led East.36 Against this 
background, developing countries called for economic and social development through better 
terms of trade, more control over Trans-National Corporations [TNC] in their territories, 
permanent sovereignty over their natural resources, and controversially, the right to nationalize 
and transfer ownership of foreign entities’ resources to the State or to its citizens. And in addition 
to economic parity, Southern countries sought to establish an obligation on the West-North to 
provide aid to the South, a proposition which is resisted to this day.37  
 
Gilman argues the NIEO movement was not homogenous is its approaches to RTD even though 
it can be considered the genealogical starting point for RTD.38 He notes that while all parties 
agreed to improve the economic situation of the South, there was no consensus on political ends 
                                                          
35 Karen A. Hudes, Towards a New International Economic Order, 2 Yale J. Int'l L. (1975) at: 
http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjil/vol2/iss1/4  see pages 88-94, 179-181  
36Nils Gilman 2015, The New International Economic Order: A Reintroduction, Humanity, Spring 2015 at: 
http://humanityjournal.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/HUM-6.1-final-text-GILMAN.pdf See page 7 in 
particular, Gilman notes the fact of, and importance of the Willy Brandt Book, North-South: A Programme for 
Survival—Report of the Independent Commission on International Development Issues (London: Pan, 1980). At the 
time, Northern leaders saw NIEO as one element in the context of a broader and Northern-based ‘‘crisis of 
governability’’ linked to emergent transnational racial and economic emancipation during the ongoing Cold War. But 
some leaders [Brandt] did listen and internalize the NIEO calls in earnest; See also Stephen Marks, 2003, Obstacles 
To The Right To Development, Harvard University at: 
https://www.google.com/search?q=OBSTACLES+TO+THE+RIGHT+TO+DEVELOPMENT+Stephen+Marks+Harvard+
University&rlz=1C1GGRV_enTD803TD803&oq=OBSTACLES+TO+THE+RIGHT+TO+DEVELOPMENT+Stephen+Marks
+Harvard+University&aqs=chrome..69i57.3697j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8 generally and pages 2, 3-4, 8 who 
notes, the concept of the RTD was always controversial emerging as it did from the legitimate preoccupation of 
newly independent countries in the South with their specific problems of development and historical exploitation. 
However, global politics and the agenda of the Commission on Human Rights was dominated by East-West cold war 
relations which meant the concerns of the South were often marginalized. So while NIEO emboldened Third World 
delegations to seek space on the world economic and human rights scene, the Western-North was hostile to the 
idea of a human right to development.  
37 Idem note 29, (Ruth Gordon) pages 143-145  
38 Idem note 36 (Nils Gilman 2015) page 2 - Including a bid to empower the UNGA to make binding international law; 
a critique of legal formalism; an effort to create a global regulatory framework for MNCs, an attempt to globalize 
‘‘embedded liberalism’’ or a realistic program for global socialism; and a key catalyst (via backlash) for the 
formulation of the neoliberal paradigm in favor of limiting state power and augmenting private power.  
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or how to achieve them. NIEO called for interstate socialism at a time of Cold War, but remained 
agnostic on how to organize national economies which, Gilman notes, were “quite amenable to 
capitalism…”39 There was acceptance of the principle of absolute respect for the economic 
sovereignty of nations, but this also gave fuel to critics of NIEO who referred to a demand to 
transfer resources ‘‘from the poor in rich countries to the rich in poor countries” where the NIEO 
unit of poverty was seen as the State, not the individual.40 In this regard, from an international 
legal perspective, NIEO argued against respect of international agreements and contracts joined 
by previous regimes of their own now post-colonial States. However in doing so, NIEO was unable 
to resolve the reciprocal legal quandary of empowering Southern states with absolute national 
sovereignty to hold this position on the one hand, without at the same time empowering 
Northern states to ignore, under their own absolute national sovereignty, the supranational legal 
injunctions proposed by the NIEO.41 In the end, the North would not budge on an issue they saw 
as culling their power in favour of Southern States, or of elites who ruled in the name of their 
own peoples.42  
 
The Westphalian-Washington Consensus 
 
Reflecting reality or myth, the World Bank and IMF Breton Woods Institutions are today generally 
qualified as Westphalian, US-European-led, Western-based Institutions. They are also associated 
with neoliberal economics based on free markets, free trade, private enterprise and consumer 
                                                          
39 Idem note 36 (Nils Gilman 2015) page 4. 
40 Idem note 36 (Nils Gilman 2015) page 4, footnote 13 referring to H.W. Arndt, Economic Development: The History 
of an Idea (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 142–45. 
41 Idem note 36 (Nils Gilman 2015) page 5, footnote 17 referring to William L. Scully of the Heritage Foundation who 
made this argument in a policy briefing titled ‘‘The Brandt Commission: Deluding the Third World’’ (April 30, 1982) 
in which he condemned ‘‘international redistributive schemes’’ as entailing ‘‘a degree of coercion, the abrogation of 
sovereignty, and the denial that man has a fundamental right to the fruits of his labor’’ 
http://s3.amazonaws.com/thf_media/1982/pdf/bg182.pdf 
42 Idem note 36 (Nils Gilman 2015) pages 7-9; See also Aggarwal and Weber Vinod K. Aggarwal and Steve Weber 
APRIL 18, 2012 The New International Economic Order, Harvard Business Review at: https://hbr.org/2012/04/the-
new-new-international-econ who note the rich West-North was confident of winning the argument because they 
believed Southern countries had little or no power to push their position; See additionally Ruth Gordon 2009, Idem 
note 38, page 144, who highlights that in the 1970s, it transpired that the North refused to vote in favor of NIEO 
resolutions and ensured western views of international law prevailed, and prevented Southern proposals from 
attaining even the aspirational status of “soft law” as a guide for governmental behavior.    
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choice, deregulation and the removal of government interference in the economy.43 As Mulcaire 
notes, the Westphalian myth was used post WWII to translate the United Nations Charter into a 
meaningful framework for international order and developed into a powerful and shared 
consciousness of society which continues, for good or for bad, to guide International Law [IL] and 
International Relations [IR] today. However, within this formula there is a fault line which appears 
between, on the one hand, the core pillars of the Westphalian IL-IR system: (i) juridical sovereign 
equality of states; (ii) respect for  territorial integrity of states; and (iii) non-interference in the 
domestic affairs of other States; and on the other hand, the more evolutionary concepts of liberal 
order involving an expanded reach of public international law, with its binding inter-state 
arbitration, institutions and agreements to regulate commerce, trade and human rights, and 
human rights approaches such as R2P which contest State sovereignty when States do not 
respect and protect the fundamental human rights of their peoples. In this way, what is loosely 
termed the Westphalian system has two distinct logics: a formal Westphalian one which respects 
autonomy and inviolability of States and their territorial jurisdictions, and a progressive 
overgrowth of evolving liberal-order logic which Harris explains, “insists upon the inexorable 
eradication of difference between international system’s constituent units” in that liberal order 
demands states be obedient to liberal principles in foreign and aspects of domestic policy.44   
 
And so it is with development and RTD. In citing Krugman, Gordon notes development policies 
tend to follow the prevailing ideology and trends in the West where cycles of conventional 
wisdom on development theory emerge and fade as yet new hypothesis are born.45 The 1980s 
embraced the neo-liberal period based on the Washington Consensus, with its firm belief in the 
market’s “invisible hand” [Adam Smith], the rationality of economic actors’ choice, and a 
minimalistic vision of the states’ regulation of economies.46 While African governments sought 
to promote their own industrialization, reduce imports save for manufacturing imports they 
                                                          
43 Idem note 43 [Harris]; See also: The IMF and the WORLD BANK: Puppets of the Neoliberal Onslaught at: 
https://www.mit.edu/~thistle/v13/2/imf.html  
44 Idem note 43, [Harris] (2015); 
45 Idem note 29, Ruth Gordon (2009), at page 145  
46 Carlos Lopes (2012), Economic Growth and Inequality: The New Post-Washington Consensus, RCCS Annual Review 
[Online], 4 | 2012, at http://journals.openedition.org/rccsar/426  DOI:10.4000/rccsar.426 See page 2. 
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needed, gain favorable terms of trade for exports and promote social and economic progress,47 
the Washington Consensus’ recipe promoted the South to deregulate markets and focus on 
creating the legal and financial frameworks that allow capital to follow freely. Gordon explains 
that Southern countries were lured into expensive development projects they could not pay for 
and quickly became heavily indebted. In tandem, private capital flows to these countries dried 
up due to lack of absorption capacity for productive investment.48 The Washington Consensus 
approach factually did not work in the South, but Southern dependence on external loans 
organically increased as a result. The IMF responded with Structural Adjustment Programmes 
[SAP] conditioned on anti-inflationary macroeconomic stabilization policies, private sector and 
free market development, controlling budget deficits, privatization of the public sector, 
eliminating subsidies and cutting public support for social services, all designed to improve 
countries’ balance of payments and control and manage foreign debt.49 However, by 2000, the 
World Bank had determined that this model too had failed to stimulate economic development 
in developing countries with weak and inadequate legal and regulatory frameworks, and 
different cultural and historical contexts.50 Testifying to the centrality and primacy of good 
economics to peace and the respect of human rights, Lopes notes that these policies prompted 
a wave of popular unrest that contributed to the recrudescence of many civil wars in the 1990s, 
and gave rise to the 1997 Asian debt crisis.51 Today there is a strong realization in the evolving 
                                                          
47 Idem note 46 Carlos Lopes (2012) at page 2. The Washington Consensus formula was presented as similarly 
applicable in developed and developing countries and was applied for more than two decades in Africa, Latin 
America, Asia, and Eastern Europe through its macroeconomic stabilization reforms and structural adjustment 
programs which ultimately led to the debt crisis in the 80s. 
48Idem note 29, Ruth Gordon (2009), at page 145 
49 Franz Heidhues and Gideon Obare 2011: Lessons from Structural Adjustment Programmes and their Effects in 
Africa, Quarterly Journal of International Agriculture 50 (2011), No. 1: 55-64 at: 
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/155490/2/4_Heidhues.pdf  
50Theories of Economic Development, G. Dang and L. Sui Pheng, Infrastructure Investments in Developing 
Economies, DOI 10.1007/978-981-287-248-7_2 , © Springer Science+Business Media Singapore 2015, at: 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/316268764_Infrastructure_Investments_in_Developing_Economies  
See page 19, citing World Bank. (2000). Entering the 21st century—World development report 1999/2000. New 
York: Oxford University Press.  
51 Idem note 46 Carlos Lopes (2012) at page 3;  See also Stephen Grenville 2018, GLOBAL ECONOMY: No consensus 
on the Washington Consensus, Lowy Institute, The Interpreter at: https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-
interpreter/no-consensus-washington-consensus  - Grenville argues that Williamson’s 10 principles of the 
Washington Consensus were a sensible starting point for economic policy but were not meant as a program of 
reform. He believes the principles were hijacked by motivated neo-liberalist manifestos including Friedman’s which 
supported nuanced paradigms around monetarism, low taxes without progressivity in rates, minimal social programs 
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global economy, in line with Oxfam’s findings, that liberal theory is causing growing inequalities 
and a scandalous concentration of income with a select few, while poverty and exclusion still 
reign in many societies.52   
 
Perspectives on the Right to Development 53  
 
Regarding the United States, Marks notes, the US opposes RTD because it challenges neo-liberal 
priorities by acknowledging rights and duties in the area of ESCR.54 This is evidenced by US 
opposition to the 2003 HRC proposal to prepare a concept document on a legally binding 
                                                          
and a diminished role for the state. These dynamics created a highly deregulated market which eventually spun out 
of control with the US 2007 subprime mortgage and the 2010 European sovereign debt crises   showing that 
developed economies were also not immune from financial crises.  Grenville states that “Financial supervisors had 
failed to constrain excessive credit growth, leverage, asset booms, and mis-matches (both maturity and currency)” 
citing that even Alan Greenspan, admitted financial markets were not self-correcting. Here Grenville notes that Latin 
American and China actually incorporated the essentials of the Washington Consensus in their models, BUT in their 
own way i.e. where the State did not abdicate from regulation but did nonetheless embrace the free market; See 
also Ronald H. Coase and Ning Wang 2013, How China Became Capitalist , Cato Institute, at: 
https://www.cato.org/policy-report/januaryfebruary-2013/how-china-became-capitalist See Conclusion which 
states: “Over the past 35 years, China has embraced capitalism not just in the economy. The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments has more than a dozen Chinese translations; the book has won the heart and mind of premier Wen Jiabao. 
The message of Adam Smith resonates strongly with the Chinese, not least because of its striking affinity with the 
traditional Chinese thinking on economy and society. A surprising outcome of China’s transition to capitalism is that 
China has found a way back to its own cultural roots.” 
52 Oxfam Davos Report “Reward work, not wealth. To end the inequality crisis, we must build an economy for 
ordinary working people, not the rich and powerful” at: https://d1tn3vj7xz9fdh.cloudfront.net/s3fs-
public/file_attachments/bp-reward-work-not-wealth-220118-en.pdf ; See also Oxfam Press Release  “Richest 1 
percent bagged 82 percent of wealth created last year - poorest half of humanity got nothing” at 
https://www.oxfam.org/en/pressroom/pressreleases/2018-01-22/richest-1-percent-bagged-82-percent-wealth-
created-last-year; See also Carlos Lopes (2012) Idem note 50, at page 3, para 15.    
53 A/HRC/39/51, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to development, 20 July 2018 at: https://documents-
dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G18/230/06/PDF/G1823006.pdf?OpenElement - In his 2018 Report, Special 
Rapporteur on RTD, Saad Alfarargi recommended very practical and doable actions to advance implementation of 
the SDGs and the Sendai, Addis and Paris Climate Change Agreements including, inter alia, accountability through 
effective legal mechanisms towards protecting and promoting RTD through people having effective access to 
detailed information and consultation schemes on all development policies and activities at the international and 
domestic levels. In particular, the recommendation on legal accountability mechanisms does not call for an 
international convention as a prerequisite to access justice for the violation of human rights in the context of 
development processes. One is left with the impression the Special Rapporteur has a good grasp of his diverse global 
audience and is navigating slowly and carefully with his recent mandate.  
54 Stephen Marks, 2004, The Human Right to Development: Between Rhetoric and Reality, Harvard Human Rights 
Journal / Vol. 17 at: https://cdn1.sph.harvard.edu/wp-
content/uploads/sites/580/2012/10/spm_the_human_right_development.pdf  See page152. However, where the 
US perceives such concerns are not present at international fora, the US has gone along with consensus positions on 
the RTD and even acknowledged RTD by supporting the 1993 Declaration of Vienna. 
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instrument for RTD holding that: “States . . . have no obligation to provide guarantees for 
implementation of any purported “right to development.”55 Marks details US resistance to RTD 
as:  
(i) Ideological in that the US experience is built on self-reliant, entrepreneurial capitalist-
based efforts and hard-won success that cannot be willed onto others through a 
Declaration. That  any transfer of resources or aid is a matter of sovereign decision 
and not subject to binding rules under the guise of advancing every human being’s 
RTD;56 
(ii) A disagreement on the very relation between RTD and ESCR with regard to Art 6(2) of 
the Declaration on the RTD.57 The US does not recognize RTD as a fundamental, basic 
or essential human right;58 
 
(iii) Conceptual objections in that the formulations and definitions of RTD are unclear with 
no agreement on content of definition;59  
 
(iv) Jurisdictional objections in that  the Human Rights Commission and its successor the 
Human Rights Council [from which the US withdrew in 2018] has no jurisdiction over 
“matters of trade, international lending and financial policy, activities of transnational 
corporations, and other aspects of globalization.”60   
                                                          
55 Idem note 54, Stephen Marks (2004), Page 150 and footnote 2, referring to United States Government, Statement 
at the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 59th Session, Comment on the Working Group on the Right to 
Development (Feb. 10, 2003); See also  Statement by Joel Danies, U.S. Representative to the U.N. Human Rights 
Commission, Summary Record of the 63d Meeting, 59th Sess., at 5, 15, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/SR.63 (2003) at:  
https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G03/140/69/PDF/G0314069.pdf?OpenElement  
56 Idem note 54, Stephen Marks (2004) page 147 and footnote 47.   
57Declaration on the Right to Development, Art 6 (2) - “All human rights and fundamental freedoms are indivisible 
and interdependent; equal attention and urgent consideration should be given to the implementation, promotion 
and protection of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights”. 
58Idem note 54, Stephen Marks (2004), Page 150 and footnote 2 - The US holds that ESCR are progressive and 
aspirational and do not require legal duties and obligations by States, especially no obligation for implementation of 
a “purported” RTD.  
59Commission on Human Rights, 54th Sess., 58th mtg. at 4, 10, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/SR.58 (1998) at: 
https://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/freedomreligion/pages/annual.aspx   
60 Idem note 54, Stephen Marks (2004), page 143 and 149. Here it is worthy of note that the US as a major UN donor 
encouraged OHCHR not to divert its limited resources to pursing accountability for RTD even though this role is 
central to OHCHR’s mandate and mission. 
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(v) Objections to a legally binding convention on RTD.  
 
Nonetheless, US practice presents an apparent contradiction on RTD, for example, when one 
year earlier at Monterey 2002, reflecting US important ODA spending in a model similar to that 
of RTD, President G.W. Bush stated that “Developed nations have a duty not only to share our 
wealth, but also to encourage sources that produce wealth: economic freedom, political liberty, 
the rule of law and human rights.”61   
 
The People's Republic of China [PRC],62 with a population of some 1.3 billion has elevated more 
than 700 million from poverty in the last 30 years 63 The World Bank notes China’s rapid growth 
from a centrally planned64 to a market based economy to become an upper middle-income 
country with complex development needs.65 Li notes, “Twenty-plus years after the “end of 
                                                          
61 President George W. Bush, Remarks at the International Conference on Financing for Development 
in Monterrey, Mexico, (Mar. 22, 2002) at: http://www.un.org/ffd/statements/usaE.htm   
62  Constitution of People's Republic of China as amended March 11, 2018 at : http://www.gov.cn/guoqing/2018-
03/22/content_5276318.htm; The Communist Party of China [CPC] explains this as a combination of democracy 
among the people and dictatorship against the people’s enemies” 
63 Phoebe Oyugi 2018, The Right to Development in Africa: Lessons From China at: 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/328223604_The_Right_to_development_in_Africa_Lessons_from_Chin
a [Included in Book Perspectives on the Right to Development, Publisher: Pretoria University Law Press (PULP)] See 
page 284 and footnote 56. The “socialist system is the fundamental system” of the Republic and the “leadership of 
the Communist Party of China is the most essential feature of socialism with Chinese characteristics. 
64 Is China a democracy? A long (and better) answer, Alan Wong, I N K S T O N E N E W S.C O M, September 2018, 
citing Jessica C Teets. Civil Society Under Authoritarianism: the China Model, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2014.) at: https://www.inkstonenews.com/china-translated/china-democracy/article/2163522  
65 The World Bank in China at: https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/overview; See also World Economic 
Forum, The world's biggest economies in 2018, at https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/04/the-worlds-biggest-
economies-in-2018/; China has clearly emerged as a major player in global relations with, according to the World 
Economic Forum, and citing IMF data, the world’s second largest economy worth $14 trillion in 2018; See also Forbes 
Magazine, referring to the number of Skyscrapers constructed globally notes that “Nobody Comes Close To China In 
2018” citing 88 new buildings in comparison to 13 in the United States. It also notes that this trend has been constant 
over the 23 years.     
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history”, China’s growth remains a bright spot for the global economy”66 having embraced 
Western ideas of “democracy” and “freedom” in its own way.67  
 
Article 33 of the PRC Constitution sets the fundamental principle that "The state respects and 
protects human rights.”68 A White Paper on “The Right to Development: China's Philosophy, 
Practice and Contribution” issued 2016, states that China “appreciates the articulation in the UN's 
"Declaration on the Right to Development", that RTD “is an inalienable human right by virtue of 
which every human person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy 
economic, social, cultural and political development, in which all human rights and fundamental 
freedoms can be fully realized."69 However, in contrast to the US, China focuses on promoting 
and implementing ESC rights as a means to eliminate poverty, and thereby, as a means to 
implementing RTD. The White Paper explains the rights to subsistence and development are the 
primary, basic human rights. That poverty is the biggest obstacle to human rights and that 
without production and supply of material goods, it is difficult or even impossible to realize any 
other human right. In this approach, RTD is incorporated into other human rights where 
development is the means to eliminate poverty and create conditions which make it possible to 
realize other human rights, and release human potential.70 China also calls on all countries to 
                                                          
66  Li, He. (2015). The Chinese Model of Development and Its Implications. World Journal of Social Science Research, 
2(2), 128-138. Available at: http://scholarworks.merrimack.edu/pol_facpub/18   Li quotes Nathan who cautions that 
other authoritarian governments encouraged by the idea that authoritarianism is compatible with modernization, 
try to pursue Chinese methods.   
67 Idem note 67 [Li, He. 2015]. Li holds that “Chinese exceptionalism” is ever present in its thinking and policy but 
that China does not promote a “China model” abroad and does not believe its Model is a one-size-fits-all, nor that it 
is an alternative to other models.” Indeed China may have practical grounds for this cautious approach as according 
to Li, the China Model is losing its luster due to its recent economic slowdown. In this regard, the Economist notes 
the current trade tussle with the US has raised uncertainty about the economic outlook for China and unsettled the 
Chinese financial markets. China’s economy has started to show signs of fatigue as credit expansion slows and 
domestic demand from government-funded infrastructure investment and consumer spending looks to be softening 
– see  Economist –“As its trade tussle with America heats up, China is on the back foot” at: 
https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2018/07/05/as-its-trade-tussle-with-america-heats-up-
china-is-on-the-back-foot   
68Idem note 62, China Constitution amended 2018, Art 33 
69 White Paper on The Right to Development: China's Philosophy, Practice and Contribution, issued December 2016 
by The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China at: 
http://www.scio.gov.cn/32618/Document/1534069/1534069.htm    
70 Idem note 69, White Paper RTD at pages 3-4 where it clearly states that:  
 RTD is incorporated into other human rights which create conditions for people to facilitate development 
and realize the RTD; 
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pursue equal, open, all-round and innovative common development noting that global 
governance must follow new world economic patterns based on equality, and an enhanced voice 
and representation of emerging markets and developing countries.71  
 
Russian Federation Constitution Article 7 states "The Russian Federation shall be a federal state, 
whose policies shall be aimed at creating conditions which ensure a dignified life and free 
development of man", and “shall protect the work and health of its people, establish a 
guaranteed minimum wage, provide state support for family, motherhood, fatherhood and 
childhood, and also for the disabled and for elderly citizens, develop a system of social services 
and establish government pensions, benefits and other social security guarantees".72 In 2015, the 
Russian Ambassador to the United Kingdom, Yakovenko, decried the politicization of human 
rights and usage of human rights for political pressure, stating: 
 
“…the Human Rights Council’s fundamental operating principle should be based on cooperation 
between states and respect for each other’s sovereignty and equality. The bulk of the 
responsibility for protection of human rights rests with individual states….the promotion and 
protection of human rights should be an objective in itself and not a political instrument nor a 
tool of geopolitics.”73   
He also explained that while Russia believes equal attention is needed for all rights, as well as the 
right to development, narrow interpretations of international human rights standards are not 
helpful. He stressed that what “is typical of one society or region is not necessarily good for 
others” and that each state and society has the right to choose their own path of development.74 
                                                          
 RTD is a human right owned by each individual as well as by the country, the nation and the entire 
population; 
 RTD must be enjoyed and shared by all peoples and all countries are responsible and the international 
community has the obligation for its realization. 
71 Idem note69, White Paper RTD, at page 4.  
72 The Constitution of the Russian Federation, Adopted at the December 12, 1993 Referendum, see Art 7 at: 
http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/571508  
73 Human Rights Undermined When Used As Political Tool [Ambassador Yakovenko] at: 
https://www.rusemb.org.uk/ambarticles/417  
74 Idem note 73 [Ambassador Yakovenko]. As a general comment, there appears to be a certain economy in Russian 
government policy and law texts on mentioning the RTD specifically, or human rights generally, while there is 
25 
 
In this optic, Russia reaffirmed its support for the United Nations at the UNGA 2018 as a “unique 
platform for equitable dialogue aimed at seeking solutions with due regard for different opinions 
and based on the purposes and principles of its Charter.”75 In these respects, Russia seeks 
increased international cooperation within Agenda 2030, the SDGs the Sendai Framework 2015-
2030 and the Paris Agreement on Climate change.76  
 
The G77 (and-China) 2014 Extraordinary Summit adopted a Declaration applauding its 
achievements on the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order 
[NIEO] in 1974, and the Declaration on the RTD in 1986.77 Leaders stressed continuing South to 
North dependency with inequity in the global economy, reaffirmed full respect for the UN 
Charter, international law and the Declaration on RTD with the sovereign right of countries to 
decide their own development priorities and strategies. They stressed international rules should 
                                                          
discernable vexation on the part of the Russian government to “the politicization of human rights to advance other 
interests.” 
75 Russia’s position at the 73rd session of the UN General Assembly at: https://rusemb.org.uk/fnapr/6659 
76 Idem note 75, Attaching importance and stating commitment to:   
 International cooperation on the social, economic, financial, environmental and other related tracks of the 
UN work for the successful implementation of the 2030 Agenda and the “comprehensive, interrelated, non-
politicized and indivisible nature of the Sustainable Development Goals”, the Sendai Framework 2015-2030 
and the Paris Agreement on Climate change; 
 Strengthening the high-level political forum [HLPF] on sustainable development under the aegis of the  
ECOSOC;   
 The UN Secretary-General reform of the UN development system in line with the Quadrennial 
Comprehensive Policy Review [QCPR] of operational activities of the UN development system;  
 The implementation of the Addis-Ababa Action Agenda on financing for development to achieve the SDGs 
stressing the importance of international cooperation;  
 Supporting the WTO and work to foster the development of a universal, rule-based, open, 
nondiscriminatory and just multilateral trade system noting their disagreement with unilateral trade 
restrictions and protectionist measures. 
Finally, calling on increased international cooperation on ensuring global food security it reaffirmed support for the 
Third UN Decade for the eradication of poverty and further elaboration of practical measures to eradicate poverty, 
develop industrial facilities, particularly in least developed countries. See also Report on Implementing the 
Principles of Sustainable Development in the Russian Federation. Russian Outlook on The New Paradigm For 
Sustainable Development. Preparing For "Rio + 20"at: 
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/1043natrepeng.pdf    
77 The South Centre • South Unity in Diversity | G77 Summit Declaration a worthy marking of 50th anniversary at 
https://www.southcentre.int/g77-extraordinary-summit-declaration-santa-cruz-15-june-2014/ . The original Group 
of 77 was set up in 1964 with a Joint Declaration of the Seventy-Seven Countries at the United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in Geneva. Today the G77 comprises134 countries, including China as an 
associate. The membership includes African countries, Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries, 
and Small Island Developing States.   
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allow policy space and flexibility for developing countries to express their national interests and 
needs while stressing that poverty in the South is juxtaposed with increasing depletion of 
resources and environmental degradation, where the power of large MNCs goes unchecked. In 
January, 2017, the Group reaffirmed its commitment to Agenda 2030.78 
 
In Africa, recent scholarship has renewed and reinforced the importance of RTD to the future of 
that continent.79 Scholars provide African perspectives of an unequal relationship which colonial 
powers formerly held and continue to hold over Africa through the unequal evolution of 
economic development in Africa, and the non-realization of RTD. Studies note that because RTD 
as both an individual and collective right of persons originated in developing countries, it 
continues to be met with resistance and lack of acceptance as a right in itself by developed 
countries. That while many [Southern] scholars see RTD as the most important of all human 
rights, a host of other scholars80 and stakeholders see RTD as an unattainable illusion, without a 
universally accepted definition, unnecessary and only conceptually and practically 
understandable within a specific context.81 Proud of the African Charter codification of RTD, they 
lament that most binding domestic, regional and international instruments are silent on RTD.82  
 
                                                          
78 G77 Urges UN to Address Developing Countries' Needs at: https://archive.indepthnews.net/index.php/global-
governance/the-group-of-77/936-g77-urges-un-to-address-developing-countries-needs - Also reaffirmed its 
commitment to paragraph 74 whereby “follow-up and review processes at all levels will be voluntary and country-
led, will take into account different national realities, capacities and levels of development and will respect policy 
space and priorities. 
79 Edited by Carol C Ngang, Serges Djoyou Kamga and Vusi Gumede 2018: Perspectives on the right to development, 
Pretoria University Law Press (PULP) at: http://www.pulp.up.ac.za/component/edocman/perspectives-on-the-right-
to-development  
80 Idem note 79, see Section on General Perceptions and footnote 4. Donnelly is frequently referred to in the 
different articles as an adversary of RTD. Footnote 4- [J Donnelly ‘The right to development: How not to link human 
rights and development’ in CE Welch Jr & RI Meltzer (eds) Human rights and development in Africa (1984) 261-283; 
A Vandenbogaerde ‘The right to development in international human rights law: A call for its dissolution’ (2013) 
31(2) Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 187-209; J Whyte ‘Book review: Development as a human right edited 
by Bard A Andreassen and Stephen P Marks, Harvard University Press, London England, 2006’ (2007) 1(1) The 
Electronic Journal of Sustainable Development 47-49.]  
81 Idem note 79, Chapter 1 page 2. They note that Southern developing countries champion the RTD cause to try to 
address injustices resulting from the imbalances of the global system while Western industrialized countries 
continue to disagree that developing countries are entitled to RTD under international law. 
82 Idem note 79, Chapter 1, page 3. 
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Saah advances an accusatory view that Sub-Saharan Africa has been alienated by Western values 
and ideologies of freedom and equality, through shrewdness, hypocrisy and false pretense while 
the West makes fortunes on the backs of impoverished Southern nations and peoples and denies 
them the RTD. He believes there is a false symbolism in “Marianne” [the US Statue of Liberty and 
symbol of French Revolution] which he denotes a “racist icon” because of an untrue western 
monologue of liberty and equality. He stresses “Monologue” must change to “Dialogue” whereby 
the real symbolic value of Marianne can deliver all peoples from poverty, and have their RTD 
accepted and universally protected.83 Adeola concludes that the extraterritorial reach of article 
22(2) of the African Charter implies a duty on state parties to assist in the realization of RTD 
beyond their national territories.84 Durojaye, Adeniyi and Ngang explain that access to RTD in the 
African context is best facilitated through traditional conflict resolution mechanisms 
characterized by communalism and which promote reconciliation. That active and meaningful 
participation of traditional parties involved in customary systems they master can promote rule 
of law and ultimately ensure that the right to socio-economic and cultural development is 
achieved in line with the SGD and Africa’s Agenda 2063. 85 However, Oyugi ultimately draws on 
lessons from China. She notes China has uplifted 700 million people from poverty in only 30 years 
through its prioritization of RTD, in particular the right to subsistence, above all other rights.86 
Referring to China’s White Paper on RTD, she notes the PRC places collective rights over 
                                                          
83 Idem note 79. See Paper by Clotaire Nengou Saah 2017: ‘Marianne’ – The Symbol of Freedom: A Critical Analysis 
In Light Of the Right to Development in Africa. 
84 Idem note 79. See Paper by Romola Adeola 2017: The Right to Development under the African Charter: Is There 
an Extraterritorial Reach? – See pages 40-45. However, he notes that realizing such assistance requires the African 
Commission to pronounce on extraterritorial RTD obligations and regional financing of development where States 
must establish effective financial monitoring systems inter alia to stem corruption.  He makes this conclusion 
following an analysis of: (i) states parties jurisdiction based on spatial extraterritoriality, effective control of territory, 
and acts of the state that have human rights consequences arising from the African Charter; (ii) requirements of 
acting individually and in solidarity with regard to Art 20(3) and Art 22 of the Charter; and (iii)  the “contentious but 
emerging recognition” of development assistance as an imperative duty on states in realizing development globally” 
85 Idem note 79, Ebenezer Durojaye, Oluwafunmilola Adeniyi and Carol C Ngang (2017), Access to Justice as a 
Mechanism for the Enforcement of the Right to Development in Africa - See conclusion.  
86 Idem note 79, Phoebe Oyugi: The Right to Development in Africa: Lessons from China. She notes China believes 
the fulfilment of RTD is key to the realization of other rights.  With regard to the North / South debate on RTD, she 
summarizes voting patterns to reveal that developing countries in the global south support RTD while developed 
countries in the North either, at best moderately support it, or are simply hostile to it. Yet she states, referring to 
works by Bunn and Alston, that RTD is, at least, on the verge of becoming a “principle” of positive international law 
– see page 278, footnote 25 referring to Bunn (n 5) 143, and also P Alston ‘The shortcomings of a Garfield the Cat 
approach to the right to development’ (1985) 15 California Western International Law Journal 510.  
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individual rights and prioritizes ESCR over CPR explaining the individual has not been, and is not 
at the centre of Chinese culture. Like other Asian countries, communitarian values are most 
important. Significantly, she points out that China’s success is measured (internally) on the 
performance of its economic policies and NOT by adherence to Marxist-Leninist theories. That 
success in realizing civil and political rights is treated as a downstream result of China’s 
struggle/efforts to increase performance of its economic policies first.87 In this she recognizes 
Africa’s unique jurisprudence on RTD and related rights88 but laments that jurisprudence cannot 
have traction for RTD in Africa while many of its countries still grapple with poverty and 
underdevelopment. On this background she concludes that China’s consideration of RTD as the 
most important right of all human rights, and citing Liu Zhenmin, UNSG  for Economic and Social 
Affairs, serves as an example for Africa.89 
  
International Financial Institutions [IFI]90  
 
De Zayas remarked in 2018 that some observers contend the World Bank and IMF have a greater 
impact on world affairs than all the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly and the 
                                                          
87 Idem notes 79 and 86 pages 292-294 -- She compares China and Africa noting that while they are different in a 
country-Vs-continent sense, they have similarities in areas such as: the sizes of their populations [1.3 million in China 
and 1.2 million in Africa]; the heterogeneousness of their populations; collectivism in China and sense of community 
in Africa; and their shared history regarding colonialism, imperialism and foreign domination.  
88 Idem note 79 and 86, page 289, see section 4.2 “Africa’s contribution to the jurisprudence on the right to 
Development” explain the key legal cases including inter alia, the SERAC case involving the Ogoni people of the Niger 
Delta and the Shell Corporation, and the Endorois in Kenya.  
89 Idem note 79 and 86, page 293 footnotes 108 and 109. While she agrees that the approach of prioritizing rights 
[RTD and ESCR] as sound, she remarks that China too, since the time of the “reform and opening up” has coming 
under increasing internal pressure from civil society groups to reform in the area of CPR and it has made efforts to 
do so. She therefore suggests that while RTD should be prioritized in Africa, governments must also protect CPR in 
tandem, that CPR cannot be violated in the name of development. Finally she calls on more research on Chinese 
implementation of RTD and for more analysis on needs in Africa to seek to apply lessons from the Chinese model 
depending on the cultures, needs and priorities of the peoples involved. See also 274, footnote 3 referring to Wo 
Hongbo “Keynote address – International seminar on the 30th anniversary of the adoption of the UN Declaration on 
the Right to Development – Sharing development: For delivering greater benefit to all people in the world” (2016) 
UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs  
https://www.un.org/development/desa/statements/mrwu/2016/12/keynote-address-international-seminar-on-
the-30th-anniversary-of-theadoption-of-the-un-declaration-on-the-right-to-development.html;      
90 The IMF and the WORLD BANK: Puppets of the Neoliberal Onslaught at: 
https://www.mit.edu/~thistle/v13/2/imf.html  
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Economic and Social Council combined.”91 Giving another perspective, UN Special Rapporteur on 
extreme poverty and human rights, Philippe Alston, notes the World Bank’s increasing reluctance 
to engage with human rights, a phenomenon he attributes mainly to the expansion of China’s 
bilateral lending program through the New Development Bank [NDB] and the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank [AIIB].92 In this regard, Kevin Rudd, President of Asia Society 
Policy Institute, notes that the new China-led NDB and AIIB are vehicles to project its socio-
economic policies in a new and affirmatively outward manner in the context of its “Belt and Road 
Initiative”93 On the human rights dimension, Alston warns, referring to a lack of nimbleness and 
heavy administrative procedures of the World Bank, and a current proliferation of major 
(alternative) international lenders including from the private sector, that China was/is not made 
more competitive through a lack of human rights conditionality in its lending. Advocating that 
prospective internal reform of the World Bank should not pursue a path of dis-connectivity with 
human rights in “a race to the bottom” regarding international standards,94 Alston insisted that 
neither World Bank or the IMF had ever pursed human rights conditionality or outcomes in their 
own work to date, so they could not now use non-engagement-with-human-rights arguments to 
explain China’s relative competitiveness [perceived or real] in development financing.95  
 
In 1998 in a Foreword to the World Bank Report  ”Development and Human Rights: The Role of 
the World Bank”, Mary Robinson, then High Commissioner for Human Rights, understood 
renewed commitment by the World Bank in human rights. Citing RTD as all-encompassing in the 
realization of ESCR and CPR, Ms. Robinson emphasized the Bank’s express role in promoting and 
                                                          
91 Report of the Independent Expert on the promotion of a democratic and equitable international order, 
A/HRC/36/40  
92 A/70/274 - Report of the Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights at: 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/70/274 The Special Rapporteur concludes that the existing 
approach taken by the Bank to human rights is incoherent, counterproductive and unsustainable. For most purposes, 
the World Bank is a human rights-free zone. In its operational policies, in particular, it treats human rights more like 
an infectious disease than universal values and obligations. 
93 Kevin Rudd: China's Rise and a New World Order-26 Oct 2017 at: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=psErow4xaIo; Xinhua News Agency (28 Mar 2015). "China unveils action plan 
on Belt and Road Initiative". The State Council of the People's Republic of China. Retrieved 16 April 2018. 
94 Philip Alston - Keynote address to the Nordic Trust Fund for Human Rights and Development Annual Workshop 
on “The Way Forward”, The World Bank, Washington DC, 15 October 2014 at: 
https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=15275&LangID=E  
95 Idem note 94 
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protecting human rights through an enhanced human dimension, strengthening institutions of 
governance and democracy, empowering individuals and communities. However, in the body of 
the same document, the Bank emphasizes its own programmatic and consequential contribution 
to a broad spectrum of human rights “Whether they are called economic and social, or civil and 
political” stressing that the Bank is limited by its Articles of Agreement [to engage with human 
rights understood]. In particular, that in all its decisions, "only economic considerations shall be 
relevant." Here the Bank noted a belief by “some” that this restriction prevents it from 
adequately confronting the issue of human rights. However, it then seems to try to counter this 
concern by highlighting the “Bank's economic and social approach to development advances a 
comprehensive, interconnected vision of human rights that is  too often overlooked” and that its 
lending decisions are based on “the quality of…project(s), and the effectiveness of the programs 
in reducing poverty…”96    
 
The Articles of Agreement, the World Bank’s [International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development] founding legal instrument, establish several limitations on the Bank’s activities:97 
 
Article 4, Section 10  
“Political activity prohibited - The Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of 
any member; nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political character of the 
member or members concerned. Only economic considerations shall be relevant to their 
decisions, and these considerations shall be weighed impartially in order to achieve the purposes 
stated in Article I”98  
                                                          
96 Development and human rights: the role of the World Bank p. cm. ISBN 0-8213-4340-8, 1998 at: 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/820031468767358922/pdf/multi0page.pdf ; While this belief may be 
the genuinely held intrinsic value belief of “some” at the Bank,  the human rights community at large continues to 
find serious and chronic fault with the negative human rights impacts of the Bank’s activities and calls systematically 
for the Bank to engage with human rights; See also : Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, Rejecting the World 
Bank’s false choice between rights & development Natalie Bridgeman Fields & Siddharth Mohansingh Akali, 
Accountability Counsel at: https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/rejecting-the-world-bank%E2%80%99s-false-
choice-between-rights-development  
97 IBRD Articles of Agreement, (As amended effective February 16, 1989) at http://siteresources.worldbank.org  
98 Idem note 97, Article 4, Section 10   
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Article 3, section 5(b)    
“The Bank shall make arrangements to ensure that the proceeds of any loan are used only for 
the purposes for which the loan was granted, with due attention to considerations of economy 
and efficiency and without regard to political or other non-economic influences or 
considerations.”99 
In 2005, the Bank’s Legal Vice-Presidency’s clarified its approach to conditionality100 referring to 
the IBRD and the IDA common article on the “Political Activities Prohibition”101 noting that: 
 
“…conditionality in Bank-financed operations is based on economic, rather than political, 
considerations. In making decisions, the Bank views these factors impartially to achieve its 
purposes. However, this position does not imply that the Bank should completely ignore political 
implications or consequences when deciding whether to lend to a borrower…the Bank needs 
relevant knowledge of the political situation in the country involved and to appreciate underlying 
social and cultural factors to ensure that conditionality is suitable to country circumstances and 
the loan will achieve its objectives.”102  
  
The Bank’s legal opinion is further explained in a Special Report in 2006 where it states:103 
“The Articles of Agreement permit, and in some cases require, the Bank to recognize the human 
rights dimensions of its development policies and activities, since it is now evident that human 
rights are an intrinsic part of the Bank’s mission.”104  
                                                          
99 Idem note 97, Article 3, section 5(b)    
100 “Review Of World Bank Conditionality: Legal Aspects Of Conditionality In Policy-Based Lending” at: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PROJECTS/Resources/40940-114615847489/LegalAspectsofConditionality.pdf  
101 Idem note 100, Article IV, Section 10 ; See also World Bank IDA Articles of Agreement, Article V, Section 6 at: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/IDA/Resources/ida-articlesofagreement.pdf  
102 Idem note 100, See Section 5, paragraphs 50-55. 
103 Special Report: The Way Forward - Human Rights and the World Bank, Ana Palacio*, Development Outreach 
World Bank Institute at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTSITETOOLS/Resources/PalacioDevtOutreach.pdf  
104 Legal Opinion On Human Rights And The Work Of The World Bank, Senior Vice President And General Counsel, 
January 27, 2006 at:  http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law-oxio/e215.013.1/law-oxio-e215-regGroup-1-law-
oxio-e215-source.pdf  
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This opinion added substantive content to the 1998 document which had avoided giving content 
to the Bank’s mission per se, limiting itself to “Strengthening…institutions, and making 
government more transparent” within a larger human rights dynamic.105 Maher referring to 
Danino’s opinion that the Articles of Agreement must be interpreted in light of the Bank’s mission 
“to alleviate poverty through economic growth and social equity” noted the latter has an 
“obvious human rights component.”106 He also acknowledges the ongoing contestation of the 
Bank’s role in human rights and believes the 2006 opinion is of unclear legal significance because 
it has not resulted in official Bank policy on decision-making on human rights.107 Nonetheless, the 
Special Report does offer concrete pathways for progress  explaining that the 2006 legal opinion 
is “permissive” and “allows leeway” to explore the Bank’s proper role in relation to human 
rights.108  In contrast, however, the Report underscores the contours of a very complex debate 
regarding the Bank and its human rights role in light of its diverse membership, challenges 
regarding universality of rights, and the critical issue that, with the current state of the law 
[Articles], human rights would “not be the basis for an increase in Bank Conditionalities”, nor 
“present an obstacle for disbursement…”109 Today, in 2019, this human rights and equity 
quandary within the Bank remains unresolved. This is evidenced in its 2017 major Safeguards 
document, the “Environmental and Social Policy for Investment Project Financing” which 
mentions human rights only in reference to its Articles of Agreement as outlined above.110 The 
                                                          
105 Idem note 102, The World Bank document stated the Bank “has always taken measures to ensure that human 
rights are fully respected in connection with projects it supports” and that “creating the conditions for the 
attainment of human rights is a central and irreducible goal of development.” 
106 Idem note 104. The same legal opinion referred in Note 104 and reproduced in Spring 2007 in “The Legal Aspects 
of the World Bank's Work on Human Rights” Roberto Dañino, Former Senior Vice President and General Counsel, 
The World Bank 2003-2006. 
107 Anthony Maher, Global Health Programme, 2017, Human Rights And The World Bank: Moral Leader Or Honest 
Broker at: http://globalhealthgovernance.org/blog/2017/11/26/human-rights-and-the-world-bank-moral-leader-
or-honest-broker  
108 Idem note 103, In the Special Report, go to section on “The Bank’s Legal Framework for Human Rights: the Way 
Forward.” In this optic, the Special Report highlights human rights: (i) as legal principles which can provide a 
normative baseline against which to assess development policies and programming; (ii) can generate actionable 
legal obligations in some circumstances; and (iii) can inform the Bank’s analytical work in the areas of governance or 
the legal empowerment of the poor. 
109 Idem note 103, Special Report at Introduction.  
110The WORLD BANK Environmental and Social Framework at: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTABOUTUS/Resources/ibrd-articlesofagreement.pdf  -- And this despite the 
Bank’s and IMF’s best efforts to engage through soft advances such as the Tilburg-GLOTHRO Guiding Principles 
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joint United Nations-World Bank Pathways to Peace Initiative testifies to a similar and 
differentiated approach where, in this policy-think document, the UN talks of protecting and 
respecting human rights while the Bank explains how its efforts [financing] can contribute to the 
overall achievement of SDGs, but again without direct commitment to human rights.111 Regarding 
the IMF, De Zayas, notes briefly that the IMF contributes to preconditions for the achievement 
of human rights through its economic and financial policies, which in recent context means 
applying “Washington Consensus” economics. He then notes that IMF must anticipate the 
consequences of the “conditionality” of its lending practices and integrate ex-ante human rights 
assessments so that its activities do not lead to violations of human rights.112   
 
This hands off, human rights-free zone type approach is not exclusive to the World Bank and the 
IMF. The Articles of Agreement for the AIIB, and agreements establishing the NDB, the Asian 
Development Bank, the African Development Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank 
all include similar formulations to the World Bank’s Articles with regard to limitations on political 
activities generating similar approaches on human rights generally, not to mention RTD in 
specific.113 However there are significant outliers where human rights conditionality in 
development aid is considered systematically in the political domain. They are: (i) the Council of 
Europe Development Bank [CEB] which focuses on solutions for refugees, internally displaced 
and migrants and conditions loan and grant applications on conformity with the political and 
                                                          
seeking positively to chart a future where human rights matter in development  See: Tilburg-GLOTHRO Guiding 
Principles at: https://pure.uvt.nl/ws/portalfiles/portal/564925/TILBURG_.PDF  
111 Pathways for Peace Pathways for Peace, Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict, Main Messages 
and Emerging Policy Directions at: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/  
112A/70/274* Report of the Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights to the General Assembly, 
2015, at: https://undocs.org/A/70/274  
113 See Articles of Agreement of the AIIB, Article 31 (2) at: https://www.aiib.org/en/about-aiib/basic-
documents/articles-of-agreement/index.html ; and Agreements Establishing: The NDB, Art 13 (e) at: 
https://www.ndb.int/wp-content/themes/ndb/pdf/Agreement-on-the-New-Development-Bank.pdf ; The African 
Development Bank, Article 38 (2) at: https://www.afdb.org/en/documents/document/agreement-establishing-the-
african-development-bank-2016-edition-92045/ ; The Inter-American Development Bank, Section 5 (f) at: 
https://sector.iadb.org/law-library/documents/agreement-establishing-inter-american-development-bank ; The 
Asian Development Bank Art 36 (2) at: https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/institutional-
document/32120/charter.pdf .  
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social aims of the Council of Europe114 based on the European Convention on Human Rights;115 
(ii) the European Investment Bank [EIB] and European Reconstruction Development Bank [ERDB] 
the world’s largest development banks whose political human rights based conditionality has 
developed over time with the Yaoundé, Lomé and Cotonou Agreements116 and whose policies 
reflect  European Union law and policy based on the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union influence conditionality relating to democratization and human rights in 
recipient countries.117 In particular, Articles 8 and 9 of the Cotonou Agreement give robust legal 
certainly to both dialogue around mutual agreement on the human rights and political 
dimensions of development aid, and on direct human rights conditionality of aid.118  
 
More broadly, OSCE countries show a broad commitment to align their foreign development aid 
to the Agenda 2030 objective to “leave no one behind”.119 However, while conditionality is an 
ongoing source of research and analysis, recent study suggests that while it can have a limited 
impact if properly designed, the evolving tendency is more towards “Softer mechanisms” based 
on learning and persuasion as alternatives to conditionalities.120 In parallel, the EU, the World 
                                                          
114 Council of Europe Development Bank - Articles of Agreement, Article XIII, (c) at: 
https://coebank.org/en/about/basic-legal-texts/  
115 European Convention on Human Rights at: https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf  
116 Political Conditionality in European Union Development Assistance, Assessing effectiveness and Consistency, 
Selma Roth, Masters in Advanced European and International Studies [2008-2009] at: https://www.ie-ei.eu/IE-
EI/Ressources/file/memoires/2009/ROTH.pdf See Conclusions on pages 38, 51,81 and 101. See also,    
117Charter Of Fundamental Rights Of The European Union At: https://ec.europa.eu/info/aid-development-
cooperation-fundamental-rights/your-rights-eu/eu-charter-fundamental-rights_en  
118 Cotonou Agreement [or “Partnership Agreement Between The Members Of The African, Caribbean And Pacific 
Group Of States Of The One Part, And The European Community And Its Member States Of The Other Part]  Articles 
8 on Political dialogue and Article 9 on Essential elements regarding human rights, democratic principles and the 
rule of law, and fundamental element regarding good governance at: 
http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/namibia/documents/eu_namibia/cotonou-agreement_en.pdf: See 
also: Anwar SHAH, 2017 Brookings Institution, “Development assistance and conditionality: Challenges in design and 
options for more effective assistance, 28 April 2017 at: https://www.oecd.org/cfe/regional-policy/Shah-
Development-assistance-and-conditionality.pdf  
119OSCE Development Co-operation Report 2018: Joining forces to leave no one behind at: https://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/development/development-co-operation-report-2018_dcr-2018-en ; OSCE targeting support to mid-
income and poorer countries while focusing on people and groups to eradicate poverty, reduce inequality, 
promoting social and economic inclusion and respect for human rights; See also  MC.DOC/1/06 Organization for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe 1 November 2006, Ministerial Council, Rules Of Procedure Of The Organization 
For Security And Co-Operation In Europe at: https://www.osce.org/mc/22775   
120 Lee Mizell, April 2017, Conditionality in practice: Emerging lessons for public investment, The Graduate Institute 
of International and Development Studies, Geneva, see Conclusion on page 17 at: 
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Bank, IMF and OSCE foreign development aid policies are seen by some as being ideologically 
[Westphalian] in favour of and promotional of the free market-based economics of the 
“Washington Consensus.”121 They are perceived to represent their shareholders' interests in the 
first place, and to be pushing a Western-based global development discourse ideologically, to 
attain their geopolitical interests.122 Critiques of the Washington Consensus hold, inter alia, that 
free trade is not always in the best interest of developing economies; that low government 
borrowing is not always appropriate; that State investment in infrastructure and the public sector 
under an interventionist approach is often needed as a driver of development, as evidenced by 
Chinese investments in developing countries in recent years; and that while privatization can be 
a strong development driver, it should not blindly apply to key public sector industries.123 As 
Lopez notes, internal debate within IFIs including the IMF and World Bank especially following 
the financial crisis of 2008 gave rise to a post-Washington-Consensus reflection, broadening the 
policy debate and a return towards Keynesian economics.124  
 
In this regard, Kilby notes that China openly opposed the post-Washington Consensus with its 
“Beijing Consensus” espousing “equitable growth, positive social change, self-determination and 
                                                          
https://www.oecd.org/cfe/regional-policy/Mizell_Conditionalities_Emerging-lessons-for-public-investment.pdf - 
Approaches are more geared towards: : (a)  narrowing the gap in priorities and knowledge prior to establishing 
conditions so as to improve the likelihood of their uptake; (b) limiting conditionalities where complex reforms are 
required; (c) emphasizing the importance of recipient  ownership of proposed changes; and (d) taking account of 
capacity constraints and opportunities in recipient States. In this context, the use of: (e) “Softer mechanisms” based 
on learning and persuasion are recommended with, or as alternatives to, conditionalities. 
121 John Williamson: The Washington Consensus as Policy Prescription for Development 
Senior Fellow, Institute for International Economics at: https://piie.com/publications/papers/williamson0204.pdf;  
See also  Tejvan Pettinger Washington consensus – definition and criticism at: 
https://www.economicshelp.org/blog/7387/economics/washington-consensus-definition-and-criticism/  
122 Ivan Lesay, 2013, Discoursing development: the case of the European Investment Bank, Institute of Economic 
Research, Slovak Academy of Sciences, Slovakia, Nova econ. vol.23 no.2 Belo Horizonte May/Aug. 2013 
at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/S0103-63512013000200007   
123 Idem note 121 - Tejvan Pettinger “Washington consensus – definition and criticism at: 
https://www.economicshelp.org/blog/7387/economics/washington-consensus-definition-and-criticism/  
124 Idem note 46 [Carlos Lopes 2012]  at page 7 and generally -  That States would again intervene to correct market 
failures, that some industries, particularly infant ones, would require a period of State protection and that different 
approaches were now on the table in both east and west which required both instructional policy reform on a global 
scale.    
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heavy State control.”125 He also notes that while historically, the US projection of aid under a 
liberal economic and political agenda was matched by China’s foreign aid policy to become a 
development leader in the South, China will henceforth organically fill any gaps left by the retreat 
of the Trump Administration from foreign development.126 Here he stresses the West has lost 
leverage globally with its neo-liberal conditionality to social and gender justice, human rights and 
environmental norms, to China’s policy of noninterference and no-strings-attached policy to aid. 
He identifies  the bringing together of all major world actors around the table as equal partners 
as THE challenge ahead in: (i) accepting local sovereignty; and (ii) only then seeking to apply what 
are accepted human rights and other global norms in those [specific] contexts.127  
 
It is good here to recall that earlier proposals for a Dialogue of Civilizations regarding human 
rights including the RTD, and IL generally, and the parallel calls for discussion on NIEO, are timely 
and necessary to address concerns expressed inter-alia by the UN Secretary General regarding a 
new world order based on cooperation. An immediate thought is how appropriate a forum IFIs 
might be to launch such Dialogue given their much diversified memberships, complex 
interactions across the globe on a daily basis,128 and noting that half of MDBs have some form of 
institutionalized safeguards mainly on environmental protection and sustainable 
development.129 However, while cooperation and dynamics between banks could, with vision, 
                                                          
125 Patrick Kilby 2017,  China and the United States as Aid Donors, Past and Future Trajectories, Policy Studies East-
West Centre at https://www.eastwestcenter.org/system/tdf/private/ps077.pdf?file=1&type=node&id=36374 See 
pages 1-11 
126 Idem note 125 – [Patrick Kilby] 2017 at page 27  
127 Idem note 125– [Patrick Kilby] 2017 at pages 24-37   
128 A Guide to Multilateral Development Banks 2018 at: https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-
documents/12274.pdf  - The World Bank (IBRD) has 189 members covering nearly every country in the world. In 
Africa, many of the sub-regional banks are associated with sub-regional organizations while 40 out of 54 African 
countries are shareholders of an African sub-regional MDB. All 54 African countries are members of the AfDB. In 
Latin America and the Caribbean 32 out of 33 countries are shareholders of at least one sub-regional MDB. Most 
MDBs including the AIIB and NDB have non-resident boards of directors and many regional and sub-regional banks 
also include non-regional members. For instance, the AIIB headquartered in Beijing has the second largest global 
membership [86] with a Board of Directors and a Senior Management Team of diverse nationalities from around the 
world; See also AIIB governance at: https://www.aiib.org/en/about-aiib/governance/members-of-bank/index.html;  
129Stewart M. Patrick 2018, AIIB: Is the Chinese-led Development Bank a Role Model? at: 
https://www.cfr.org/blog/aiib-chinese-led-development-bank-role-model - Recently the Articles of the AIIB were 
amended to give exclusive decision power on loans to President Li. This had raised heads as to why? ; Also Idem note 
128 on - AIIB governance - AIIB whose Board of Governors is also staffed by UK and German nationals.   
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catalyze positive change for human rights/RTD, the underlying economic philosophies on market 
driven free enterprise economics of the West, versus the communitarian ESC rights approaches 
of the East, currently represents a civilizational flash-point which needs attention if progress is to 
be made on RTD.   
 
Transnational Corporations [TNC]  
 
While TNCs contribute vastly to human development, the global economy and globalization, their 
conduct often raises grave environmental and human rights concerns in many countries around 
the world.130 Following earlier efforts by Mary Robinson and Koffi Annan through the Global 
Compact, the OECD “Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises” and the “Norms Responsibilities 
of transnational corporations and other business enterprises with regard to human rights,” the 
[western-based] international business community stressed that “If put into effect, the [norms] 
would undermine human rights, the business sector of society, and the right to development.”131 
                                                          
130 See The UN "Protect, Respect and Remedy" Framework for Business and Human Rights at https://business-
humanrights.org/sites/default/files/reports-and-materials/Ruggie-protect-respect-remedy-framework.pdf   
131   Mary Robinson, “The Business Case for Human Rights,” Visions of Ethical Business, Financial Times Management, 
18 December 1998; available at http://www.burmalibrary.org/reg.burma/archives/199812/msg00273.html;  Norms 
on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with regard to Human Rights, 
U.N. ESCOR, 55th Sess.,22d mtg., at Agenda Item 4, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub2/2003/12/Rev.2 (2003), 
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/links/norms-Aug2003.html ; Organisation For Economic Co-Operation And 
Development, OECD, Guidelines For Multinational Enterprises 15 (2000) at: 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf ;  UN Commission's decision re Norms - 20 Apr 2004, decision 
2004/116 at https://business-humanrights.org/en/united-nations-sub-commission-norms-on-business-human-
rights-explanatory-materials ; Juli Campagna, United Nations Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights: The International Community Asserts 
Binding Law on the Global Rule Makers, 37 J. Marshall L. Rev. 1205 (2004) Available at: 
http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/faculty_scholarship/682 ;  Joint views of the IOE & ICC on the UN human 
rights norms for business at https://business-humanrights.org/en/joint-views-of-the-ioe-icc-on-the-un-human-
rights-norms-for-business ; UN Commission on Human Rights Resolution E/CN.4/RES/2005/69 at 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/45377c80c.html ; Efforts by Mary Robinson and Koffi Annan around 2000 saw the 
Global Compact call on corporations to embrace universal principles concerning human rights, labor standards and 
the environment”. Collaboration with OECD produced “Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises” while in 2003, the 
Human Rights Sub-Commission adopted “Norms Responsibilities of transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises with regard to human rights” However, these norms were quickly abandoned by the Human Rights 
Commission on the basis that they had “no legal standing.” In parallel, the international business community 
virulently opposed the draft norms and both the International Chamber of Commerce [ICC] and the International 
Organization of Employers [IOE] announced that “If put into effect, they [norms] would undermine human rights, 
the business sector of society, and the right to development” and underscored the State as “the duty-bearer of 
human rights obligations, not private persons.” 
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In 2008, the HRC adopted the “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Policy Framework and Guiding 
Principles [GP] proposed by SRSG on Business and Human Rights, Professor John Ruggie around 
three core principles: (i) the State duty to protect against human rights abuses by third parties, 
including business, through appropriate policies, regulation, and adjudication; (ii) the corporate 
responsibility to respect human rights, i.e. to act with due diligence to avoid infringing the rights 
of others; and (iii) the need for greater access by victims to effective remedies, judicial and non-
judicial.132 The GPs included no new international law obligations and did not undermine legal 
obligations of States under IHRL.133 Despite the current state of the law where States are the 
primary duty bearers for human rights, in 2014, HRC Resolution 26/9 established an “open ended 
intergovernmental working group” to draft an international legally binding instrument to 
regulate, in IHRL, activities of TNCs and other business enterprises.134 However, while some 
including the EU supported a binding treaty, many opponents highlighted that a treaty would 
abandon States’ accountability for human rights violations by individuals and corporations within 
their borders -- as applied by the GP framework. Professor Ruggie also cautioned treaty 
proponents against “… largely symbolic gestures,”135 The 2016 sitting of the Forum on Business 
                                                          
132 Special Representative of the Secretary-General on human rights and transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises – Overview at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Pages/SRSGTransCorpIndex.aspx; 
The SRSG liaised closely with the human rights working group of the Global Compact in order to identify, exchange 
and promote best practices and lessons learned. In his report to the HRC of 27 May 2011, the SRSG annexed the 
Guiding Principles [GPs] on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and 
Remedy” Framework which are grounded in: (a) States’ existing obligations to respect, protect and fulfil human 
rights and fundamental freedoms;(b) The role of business enterprises as specialized organs of society performing 
specialized functions,   required to comply with all applicable laws and to respect human rights; (c) The 
need for rights and obligations to be matched to appropriate and effective remedies when breached. 
133Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework at: 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf See General Principles page 
2. See also  Press Statement CIVICUS urges the international community to address human rights abuses by 
corporations at http://www.civicus.org/index.php/media-resources/media-releases/2574-press-statement-civicus-
urges-the-international-community-to-address-human-rights-abuses-by-corporations 
134 United Nations A/HRC/RES/26/9, Human Rights Council, Twenty-sixth session, Agenda item 3 at: 
https://www.ihrb.org/pdf/G1408252.pdf; See also  Nader Tadros and People’s Advocacy (2009). Right Holders and 
Duty Bearers. UNICEF Wiki. Retrieved 11:31, 18 April, 2019 from http://www.advocate-for-
children.org/doku.php?id=advocacy:rights_based_approach:rights_holders_duty_bearers&rev=1257466824. 
135 The Proposed Business and Human Rights Treaty: Four Challenges and an Opportunity, Sara McBrearty, Harvard 
International Law Journal / Vol. 57 Online Symposium at http://www.harvardilj.org/wp-
content/uploads/McBrearty_0615.pdf;  The EU and the International Committee of Jurists [ICJ] supported a treaty 
– See Proposals For Elements Of A Legally Binding Instrument On Transnational Corporations And Other Business 
Enterprises October 2016, at https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Universal-OEWG-session-2-ICJ-
submission-Advocacy-Analysis-brief-2016-ENG.pdf; See also Implementation of the UN Guiding Principles on 
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and Human Rights noted that in adopting the SDGs, the General Assembly mentioned the GPs 
only in passing as “they were less important than ensuring that business engage in the Goals on 
any terms.” It held that companies are driven “exclusively by considerations of business risk or 
opportunity” not human rights obligations. It also stressed the (controversial) need for an 
international legally binding instrument to hold business accountable.136 Interestingly, the 2018 
sitting of this Forum had already advanced to discussion of a “draft zero” of this legally binding 
instrument and recommended to continue dialogue based on receiving commentaries on the 
draft. Of substantive note here however is the call for clarification and precision of the language 
in the draft, in particular “the articles covering the scope, definitions, jurisdiction, applicable law, 
rights of victims, legal liability and international cooperation…” in effect, on a lot of key 
substantive content. 137 In the meantime, provisions in treaties which protect the environment 
are few and environmental customary law is weak, making “litigation before international 
tribunals largely pointless…”138 The tendency therefore has been to seek redress for 
environmental harms through the more robust architecture of international human rights law 
before International Tribunals and domestic courts which can exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction 
                                                          
Business and Human Rights - The Directorate-General For External Policies, Policy Department  page 38, at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/578031/EXPO_STU(2017)578031_EN.pdf     
136 Human Rights Council, Forum on Business and Human Rights, 14–16 November 2016 Fifth session of the Forum 
on Business and Human Rights: summary of discussions A/HRC/FBHR/2016/2 at 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/HRC/FBHR/2016/2 The Forum addressed the impact of 
agribusiness and extractive industries, and the “apparent paradox where investments geared towards fighting 
climate change, such as renewable energy projects, had an adverse impact on indigenous peoples”. It noted that 
that the main barrier to accountability and access to remedy was the implementation of already existing judicial 
protection of human rights at the national level and the promotion of the Guiding Principles. It further stressed the 
well-trodden issue of complex corporate structures which continue to protect companies from the consequences of 
adverse human rights impact, including legal accountability. It also noted: (a) inadequate enforcement of relevant 
local laws; (b)The persecution of victims of business-related human rights abuses tended to discourage victims from 
coming forward; (c) Access to legal representation was a major barrier for victims; (d) Operational-level grievance 
mechanisms were not enough for cases addressing situations of serious human rights violations. 
137 A/HRC/40/48 - Report on the fourth session of the open-ended intergovernmental working group on 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights, 2 January 2019 at: 
https://www.business-humanrights.org/sites/default/files/documents/IGWG-report-4th%20session.pdf; See 
paragraph 13.  
138 See Climate Change and International Human Rights Litigation: A Critical Appraisal Eric A. Posner University Of 
Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 155:1925], page 1927 and footnote 6, See also Human Rights And The Environment, 
Icelandic Human Rights Centre at http://www.humanrights.is/en/human-rights-education-project/human-rights-
concepts-ideas-and-fora/human-rights-in-relation-to-other-topics/human-rights-and-the-environment  
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for the relevant offenses.139 But successes for victims has been very limited as evidenced by key 
cases of litigation including, among others, the Ogoni trials, Kiobel, TriFigura and other cases 
pursued under the US Alien Torts Act and EU Regulation No 44/200120 –[Brussels I recast]. 140 As 
Kohl notes, international law does not get its “proverbial hands dirty by getting involved in the 
domestic law quarrels between populations and global corporations.” She explains that 
“territoriality is deeply embedded in what may appear to be relatively insignificant procedural or 
technical domestic rules” but that these rules make judges the enforcers of the territorial State, 
and de facto border-guards to determine payment obligations and accountability (or not) across 
borders. She holds this tends to use the law to “ring-fence local capital from foreign claims of 
                                                          
139 See 2001 landmark decision of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights -- The Social and Economic 
Rights Action Centre et al. v. Nigeria, Communication 155/96, paragraph 69 where the Commission found “…the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria in violation of Articles 2, 4, 14, 16, 18(1), 21 and 24 of the African Charter”; See also See 
footnote 12, The UN ‘Norms on the Responsibility of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises 
With Regard To Human Rights’: A Requiem, Deakin Law Review [2012] Volume 17 No 1.  “Such approaches were 
prevalent within the UN Draft Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations (UNCTC, Transnational Corporations, 
Services and the Uruguay Round (United Nations, 1990) 231–43   
140The Application Of The Local Remedies Rule Under The African Charter On Human And Peoples’ Rights: With A 
Case Study Of Communications From The Niger Delta, Bernadine M. Agocha, Institute Of Comparative Law McGill 
University, Montreal, November 2009 at: 
http://digitool.library.mcgill.ca/webclient/StreamGate?folder_id=0&dvs=1504191643501~358; (ii) Kiobel, 
Individually And On Behalf Of Her Late Husband Kiobel, Et Al. V. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. Et Al.  Certiorari To The 
United States Court Of Appeals For The Second Circuit.  No. 10–1491. Argued February 28, 2012—Reargued 
October 1, 2012—Decided April 17, 2013; (iii)   Amnesty International: The Toxic Truth: About A Company Called 
Trafigura, A Ship Called The Probo Koala, And The Dumping Of Toxic Waste In Côte D’ivoire at: 
https://www.amnesty.org/fr/documents/AFR31/002/2012/en/;  (iv)  Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534, 
554 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); See also Transnational Litigation And Institutional Choice, Cassandra Burke Robertson, Boston 
College Law Review [Vol. 51:1081]. See Introduction - on the Chevron-Texaco case; (v) His Royal Highness Okpabi V 
Royal Dutch Shell Plc, Lucky Alame V Royal Dutch Shell Plc [2017] Ewhc 89 (Tcc); Jurisdiction And International 
Environmental Group Actions at https://internationalandtravellawblog.com/2017/02/12/his-royal-highness-
okpabi-v-royal-dutch-shell-plc-lucky-alame-v-royal-dutch-shell-plc-2017-ewhc-89-tcc-jurisdiction-and-
international-environmental-group-actions/ ; See also legislation and case law as follows:  28 U.S. Code § 1350 - 
Alien’s action for tort “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort 
only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” Available at 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/1350  ; Article 4 Brussels I Regulation, Article 6 Recast. See The 
Brussels I Recast - A guide to the changes to the EU jurisdiction regime, Linklaters 2014  at 
www.linklaters.com/.../141118_Recast_Briefing_Newsletter.pdf ; EU Regulation No 44/200120 as continued in 
Brussels I recast. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32001R0044:EN:HTML ;Wiwa v. 
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000) ; Kiobel, Individually And On Behalf Of Her Late Husband 
Kiobel, Et Al. V. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. Et Al.  Certiorari To The United States Court Of Appeals For The Second 
Circuit. No. 10–1491. Argued February 28, 2012—Reargued October 1, 2012—Decided April 17, 2013; Trafigura v 
Cote D’Ivoire 2006; His Royal Highness Okpabi V Royal Dutch Shell Plc, Lucky Alame V Royal Dutch Shell Plc [2017] 
Ewhc 89 (Tcc); Jurisdiction And International Environmental Group Actions at 
https://internationalandtravellawblog.com/2017/02/12/his-royal-highness-okpabi-v-royal-dutch-shell-plc-lucky-
alame-v-royal-dutch-shell-plc-2017-ewhc-89-tcc-jurisdiction-and-international-environmental-group-actions/     
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entitlement…”141 In juxtaposition, Emeseh, Ako, Okonmah, Obokoh and Ogechukwu explain the 
dominant neoliberal policy of deregulation, liberalization and privatization has diminished 
powers of the State to play an active role in the regulation of financial market activities. They 
hold that economic agents [TNCs] are able to manipulate the machinery of government to 
impose restrictions on market activities for their proper gains i.e. profit.  They note this can also 
diminish the regulatory power of States with regard to the environmental, social and human 
rights impact of TNC activities.142 Other constraining factors include the prevailing positivist 
Westphalia-based paradigm that States are subjects of international law, and TNCs are not. TNCs 
have no international legal personality and so cannot be pursued directly for violations of 
international human rights law. As such, it falls to States to regulate TNC activities.143 More 
optimistically however, attitudes of TNCs towards human rights and the environment may, 
according to Edgecliff-Johnson, be undergoing an altruistic transition from a Friedmanian fixation 
on profit, to requiring “a positive contribution to society, benefiting customers and communities 
as well as shareholders” as the possible foundation for a new model for capitalism based on the 
watchwords of purpose, inclusion and sustainability. Why he asks “should the citizens of this 
world keep companies around whose sole purpose is the enrichment of a few people?”144 Only 
time will tell if this is simply lip service to feel-good initiatives or a shift of more solid nature.  
 
The Context for Sustainable Development 
  
The International Commission of Jurists [ICJ] in 2016 declared a new urgency to counter “a global 
assault on the concept of the rule of law and respect for the international human rights legal 
order.”145 Applauding the international community for adopting Sustainable Development Goal 
                                                          
141 Uta Kohl, 2018, Territoriality and Globalization,  Oxford Handbook on Jurisdiction in International Law' at: 
https://www.academia.edu/37537020/Territoriality_and_Globalization  
142 Emeseh, Engobo and Ako, Rhuks Temitope and Okonmah, Patrick and Obokoh, Lawrence Ogechukwu, 
Corporations, CSR and Self Regulation: What Lessons from the Global Financial Crisis? (2009). German Law Journal, 
Vol. 11, No. 2, pp. 230-259, 2009. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1631028, See pages 234-235 in 
particular. 
143 Claire Cutler, 2001, Critical Reflections on the Westphalian Assumptions of International Law and Organization: 
A Crisis of Legitimacy, Review of International Studies, Vol 27, No. 2 (April 2001- pp 133-150  
144 Andrew Edgecliffe-Johnson January 4, 2019, Beyond the bottom line: should business put purpose before 
profit? at: https://www.ft.com/content/a84647f8-0d0b-11e9-a3aa-118c761d2745 
145 ICJ Annual Report 2016 at https://www.icj.org/icj-annual-report-2016-now-online/ see Introduction. 
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16, it recognized Rule of Law as fundamental to sustainable development around the globe and 
underlined the need to develop the nexus between development and the legal framework of 
human rights.146 In tandem, political leaders [e.g. Merkel, Putin, Rudd, and Kissinger] across the 
world also advanced an appetite for new economic approaches to address social and economic 
inequities. 147  
 
On 9 January 2018, Professor Schwab of The World Economic Forum [WEF] cited evidence to the 
New York Times of a fractured world characterized by polarization. He then advanced a model of 
“equitable globalization” which would be able to preserve democracy as the fundamental 
element of a future global management model.148 In Davos on 19 January 2018, Professor 
Schwab interviewed UN Secretary General, Antonio Guterres, who warned listeners of today’s 
“dangerous world” catalyzed by fragile states, institutions and societies with protracted and new 
conflicts combining terrorism and terrible violations of human rights. Highlighting evolving 
megatrends in population growth and movements of people, climate change, food insecurity and 
water scarcity, he expressed great concern that the United Nations and the greater international 
community are currently unable to either prevent or resolve conflicts because of the unclear 
global power relations which are unfolding.  Mr. Guterres called for:  
 
                                                          
146 Idem note 145 [ICJ] Annual Report 2016 at Introduction -- It also emphasized rising anger regarding globalization 
and the dangers of global “profit-making businesses with tremendous privileges” and the need to hold them to 
account through the elaboration of an international treaty on business and human rights.  
147 International Business Merkel, at Davos, calls for a "global economic charter" By Carter Dougherty Jan. 30, 2009 
At: https://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/30/business/worldbusiness/30iht-davos.4.19817885.html  Angela Merkel 
advocated for ‘a new charter for a global economic order” based on multilateral solutions instead of a unilateral, 
protectionist course of action;  Wall Street Journal: Putin Speaks at Davos, Updated Jan. 28, 2009 at: 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123317069332125243 Vladimir Putin called for free enterprise and strengthened 
global regulation based on international law and multilateral agreements  and refuted both isolationism and, 
interestingly, excessive intervention by the State in economic activity;  Kevin Ruud denounced “unfettered 
capitalism” and called for a new era of “social capitalism” in which government intervention and regulation feature 
heavily - Sydney Morning Herald, in its article “Time for a new world order: PM  at: 
https://www.smh.com.au/national/time-for-a-new-world-order-pm-20090131-gdtbtm.html ;  Henry Kissinger 
advised the US and its potential partners to seize the opportunity to transform a moment of crisis into a vision of 
hope by building and securing an international order together - HENRY A. KISSINGER JAN. 12, 2009. The chance for 
a new world order. New York Times at: https://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/12/opinion/12iht-
edkissinger.1.19281915.html  
148 WEF's Klaus Schwab: What to Expect in 2018 at https://www.wsj.com/video/wef-klaus-schwab-what-to-expect-
in-2018/39400C32-CD00-4ECC-BD64-853C7D0607B0.html  
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“the enhancement of a new generation of partnerships... for an inclusive and sustainable 
development - the best way to prevent crises and conflicts in today’s world.” stating his belief that  
“only with a very strong dialogue and partnership between governments, international 
organizations and the private sector, it would be possible to transform them in instruments that 
would allow for fantastic increase in the well-being of people…”  149 
 
Regarding shared values of society after the cold war, Mr. Guterres emphasized that previously 
in Europe, a multipolar system without multilateral governance had led directly to the WWI.150 
He warned that today’s multilateral governance mechanisms including the UN are weak, 
stressing that prosperity requires  a “Cooperative World” with a cementing ingredient of 
multilateral governance by the future key players to see what type of synthesis can be put 
together in a positive way where the UN Charter and human rights are not compromised by 
questions of national sovereignty.151  
 
Muggah and Tiberghien told the WEF that current liberal order built by the US and its allies 
around the UN, the IMF, World Bank, WTO, NATO, the G20 and a thicket of treaties and 
agreements is in an “advanced state of meltdown” where profound instability needs world 
leaders to engage in collective action to set rules for the road152 The WEF Report 2018 “Creating 
                                                          
149 Secretary General António Guterres, Remarks at the special session on "Cooperation for Peace: Tackling the 
Root Causes of Global Crises" at https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2017-01-19/secretary-generals-
cooperation-peace-remarks    
150Idem note 149, See also Birthe Hansen Bertel Heurlin, The New World Order – 2000 - Contrasting Theories, 
Palgrave Macmillan,  see chapter 5:  The Unipolar World Order and its Dynamics at: 
https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781403905277_5; Macey, Jonathan R. and Miller, Geoffrey P. (1992) 
"The End of History and the New World Order: The Triumph of Capitalism and the Competition between Liberalism 
and Democracy," Cornell International Law Journal: Vol. 25: Iss. 2, Article 1 at: 
http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj/vol25/iss2/1 at footnote 13 citing Francis Fukuyama, The End Of History And 
The Last Man (1992) - “As mankind approaches the end of the millennium, the twin crises of authoritarianism and 
socialist central planning have left only one competitor standing in the ring as an ideology of potential universal 
validity: liberal democracy .... Two hundred years after they first animated the French and American revolutions, the 
principles of liberty and equality have proven not just durable but resurgent.”   
151 Idem note 150 [UNSG Guterres]  
152 Robert Muggah and Yves Tiberghien, 2018 – “It’s Time to get used to a New Global Order with China and the U.S. 
at its centre – at : https://ipolitics.ca/article/time-get-used-new-global-order-china-u-s-centre/ -  Muggah and 
Tiberghien claim that three competing versions of future world order “crashed together” in Davos:  a full-scale US 
retreat from the current order; Chinese leaders who proposed a new global economic system built around Beijing; 
and maintaining the current liberal order proposed by Canada Prime Minister Trudeau and French President Macron. 
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a shared future in a fractured world” starts with an upbeat tone on global economic recovery 
since the 2008 citing IMF predictions of growth and financial optimism for the immediate period, 
particularly for top MNCs.153 However, it quickly reveals a reality that lack of social inclusion and 
environmental sustainability has resulted in no wage increases in many parts of the world with 
massive inequality between rich and poor.154 With this as background, later in 2018, UNSG 
Guterres called on developed countries to support ECOSOC and the HLPF to implement the NIEO 
1974 Declaration. However, he underlined that trade conflicts [e.g. US-China] and an absence of 
adequate safeguards and mitigation measures against the pace of monetary policy adjustments 
in the US, and increasing levels of external debt could undermine progress towards a multilateral, 
rule-based and equitable global trade regime. He lauded South-South cooperation, in particular, 
China’s Belt and Road Initiative as an important catalyst for boosts in infrastructure investments 
in both developing countries of the South, and in some countries in Europe. Finally, he warned 
that exceptional stimulus measures employed by the central banks in developed countries after 
the financial crisis in 2008–2009 [i.e. State intervention to create demand and recovery in their 
economies following Keynesian doctrine] which, because of the need for payback [or 
“releveraging” after a long period of “deleveraging”], may lead to even more increases in State 
                                                          
153 Global Agenda, Davos-Klosters, Switzerland 23-26 January, 2018, World Economic Forum Annual Meeting, 
Creating a Shared Future in a Fractured World at: http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_AM18_Report.pdf  
154 Idem note 153 page 23 referring to Oxfam Report, Reward work, not wealth. To end the inequality crisis, we 
must build an economy for ordinary working people, not the rich and powerful. 
https://d1tn3vj7xz9fdh.cloudfront.net/s3fs-public/file_attachments/bp-reward-work-not-wealth-220118-en.pdf; 
See also Oxfam Press Release  “Richest 1 percent bagged 82 percent of wealth created last year - poorest half of 
humanity got nothing” at https://www.oxfam.org/en/pressroom/pressreleases/2018-01-22/richest-1-percent-
bagged-82-percent-wealth-created-last-year - at Dedication and Foreword  
https://d1tn3vj7xz9fdh.cloudfront.net/s3fs-public/file_attachments/bp-reward-work-not-wealth-220118-en.pdf ;  
The report highlights the challenge is to find ways to reduce extreme poverty through increasing people’s rights, 
and balancing ecological and economic systems that sustain life, and sustain wealth.”  Declaring   there must be 
“justice; fair use of the world’s natural resources; a global economy that reduces inequality; (and) a world that 
does not discriminate against women or minorities” it insists the most effective way to meet these objectives lies 
in “people demanding their rights to livelihoods and decent work, and working together to increase living 
standards and reduce vulnerability”.  The report, noted that reducing inequality is now high on the agenda of 
global institutions and world leaders through SDG 8 and 10 and that right to be heard and to have a recognized 
identity are also a fundamental part of human well-being and note that all these rights are explicitly grounded in 
the UDHR as well as relevant Treaties and Covenants. It also declares that the answer is simple. There must be 
“justice; fair use of the world’s natural resources; a global economy that reduces inequality; (and) a world that 
does not discriminate against women or minorities.” It insists the most effective way to meet these objectives lies 
in “people demanding their rights to livelihoods and decent work, and working together to increase living 
standards and reduce vulnerability”. 
45 
 
debt and a rise in asset prices as countries scramble to meet these loans. This, he stated, 
represents the greatest risk to the global economy (which directly impacts RTD) from 2018 
onward despite that conditions for investment are now favorable.155   
 
The last paragraphs represent a glimpse of the operational context within which future efforts 
toward realizing RTD must take place. It is therefore instructive to look at a 2016 summary status 
of RTD by former High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, on the 20th anniversary of 
the Declaration on the RTD where she stated:  
 
“We live in challenging times. Across the globe, millions are suffering the merciless, often 
devastating, effects of the many global crises of our age. The global financial and 
economic crisis, the food crisis, the energy crisis and the climate crisis have converged in 
a multi-front assault on human dignity. And our institutions of governance, at both the 
global and national levels, have been at best negligent, and at times complicit, in this 
onslaught. […] This was not the vision of […] the Declaration on the Right to Development 
[…]. A debate has been raging in the halls of the United Nations and beyond. On one side, 
proponents of the right to development assert its relevance (or even primacy) and, on the 
other, sceptics (and rejectionists) relegate this right to secondary importance, or even 
deny its very existence. Unfortunately, while generating plenty of academic interest and 
stimulating political theatre, that debate has done little to free the right to development 
from the conceptual mud and political quicksand in which it has been mired all these 
years.” 156  
 
Looking forward, the High Commissioner said the challenge is to move beyond the myths, 
distortions and misunderstandings that plagued RTD since “its codification” in 1986.  She 
                                                          
155 A/73/290 Towards a New International Economic Order, Report of the Secretary-General 2018 at: 
https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/publication/2018-reports-of-the-secretary-general-to-the-general-
assembly/  
156 Navi Pillay, High Commissioner for Human Rights, HR/PUB/12/4, United Nations Publication, Sales No.ISBN-13: 
978-92-1-154194-6, eISBN-13: 978-92-1-055972-0, © 2013 United Nations at: 
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/RightDevelopmentInteractive_EN.pdf See Foreword 
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emphasized RTD prescribes the formulation for national and international development policies, 
effective international cooperation and reform, and the removal of obstacles to development 
including human rights violations. Thus, she stressed, that “if you do not believe” RTD is codified 
in the UN Declaration, is a universal right with human beings as the right holders and 
governments as duty bearers, that everyone has an entitlement to participate in, contribute to 
and enjoy development, then “ you will know that you have left the realm of human rights 
analysis, and entered into a geopolitical boxing match that uses the right to development as a 
proxy for other issues that have long complicated relations between North and South.”157  
In this same optic, HRC Resolution 33/14 of 2016 on the RTD decided in paragraph 13, c, to inter 
alia:  
“finalize consideration of the criteria and operational sub-criteria…in 
relation to the elaboration of a comprehensive and coherent set of 
standards for the implementation of the right to development, and shall 
also take appropriate steps to ensure respect for the practical application 
of these standards, which could take various forms, including guidelines 
on the implementation of the right to development, and evolve into a 
basis for consideration of an international legal standard of a binding 
nature, through a collaborative process of engagement”158  
A close reading of this paragraph reveals that a legally binding standard could evolve from a more 
general standard setting exercise for the implementation of RTD. OHCHR speaks to this 
conditional perspective  in its Factsheet 37 stating, inter alia, that development has been and 
continues to be understood as a primarily economic process measured by GNP, ignoring 
manifestations of economic policies whose net yields are “rising poverty, growing inequalities, 
and unprecedented economic, social, cultural, political, environmental and climate crises.”159 
                                                          
157 Idem note 156 [Navi Pillay] at Foreword 
158 A/HRC/RES/33/14, 5 October 2016, Resolution adopted by the Human Rights Council on 29 September 2016 
33/14. The right to development at: https://undocs.org/EN/A/HRC/RES/33/14  
159 Frequently Asked Questions on the Right to Development, Factsheet No. 37, United Nations High Commissioner 
for Human Rights at: https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FSheet37_RtD_EN.pdf See Introduction 
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This, it is emphasized here, is one of the crucial challenges in implementing RTD i.e. how to better 
focus on “economic, social, cultural and political development with people at its centre” to offer 
a more informed effective approach in future.160  
 
And so continues the now more than 30 years’ politico-economic war on RTD. The question is if 
it too will have its Westphalia-type-peace moment any time soon? Ramcharan writing in 2017 
notes that both development [SDGs] and human rights [RTD] urgently require reform and 
modernization with new thinking in which Global Dialogue on the question of the real universality 
of human rights is paramount.161 Such a proposition seems plausible and the UN is well 
positioned to contribute.162  
 
Recent Contours for Newest World Order 
 
Regarding the High Commissioner Pillay’s reference to the “conceptual mud and political 
quicksand” in which RTD has been mired for years, it is instructive and necessary to also look at 
broader world order evolution to see what factors will shape the future of a legal RTD. Sengupta 
stresses with the current phase of globalization, international cooperation is as important as the 
package of national policies in implementing a strategy for realizing RTD. He also notes the 
Declaration clearly indicates that the primary responsibility for implementing RTD belongs to 
States and that the international community has the duty to cooperate to enable States to fulfil 
that obligation through international cooperation where all, or most, rights are realized through 
                                                          
160 Frequently Asked Questions on the Right to Development, Fact Sheet No. 37, United Nations, New York, see 
Introduction.  
161Bertrand G. Ramcharan , 2017, Modernizing the United Nations human rights system at: https://www.universal-
rights.org/blog/modernising-united-nations-human-rights-system/    
162  Amitav Acharya 2016,The Future of Global Governance, August 2016Global Governance 22(4), at: 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/320058921_The_Future_of_Global_Governance ; Chantal Line 
Carpentier 2018, How United Nations reform can support a reimagined democracy, Global Sustainable 
Development Goals for people-centred economies and democracies at:   
https://www.globalpolicywatch.org/blog/2018/10/08/un-reform-democracy/ ; See also UN Retains Strong Global 
Image at: http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/09/17/united-nations-retains-strong-global-image/ ; Brooking Institute, 
Is the UN a Friend or a Foe? at: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/10/03/is-the-un-a-
friend-or-foe/ ; “Making the United Nations Great Again”: Bold Reforms Underway at: 
https://www.usglc.org/blog/making-the-united-nations-great-again-bold-reforms-underway/  
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an appropriately high and sustainable growth of the economy.163 For cooperation to happen, 
there needs to be stability and coherent dialogue at the global level in the flux of current change. 
However, theories on new world order abound as Agenda 2030 moves ahead while Petito 
contends there is no blueprint to construct multicultural and peaceful world order to facilitate 
such cooperation.164   
 
In 1989, Fukuyama announced the “End of History” proclaiming the triumph of the West and the 
“total exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives to Western liberalism.”165 Huntington retorted 
with “The Clash of Civilizations?”, a vision of an “Us and Them” type “Realist” approach to an axis 
of post-Cold War world politics where western power and culture would vie for place with non-
western civilizations, a "West and the rest” paradigm, the rest made up of civilizational blocs 
notably Islam, Orthodox (Russia mainly) China, India, Japan, Latin America and Africa. Anarchy 
would underpin the fundamental nature of world affairs [human rights and RTD], nation states 
would remain the most important actors but their domestic interests and actions would be 
shaped by cultural and civilizational factors.166    
 
One prominent reaction to Huntington leaning toward a peaceful or utopian vision of world order 
was the 1998 UN General Assembly Resolution, proposed by President of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran, Mohammad Khatami, which designated 2001 as the Year of the “Dialogue Civilizations.”167 
                                                          
163  Arjun K. Sengupta, 2013, Conceptualizing the right to development for the twenty-first century, in “Realizing 
the Right to Development - Essays in Commemoration of 25 Years of the United Nations Declaration on the Right 
to Development”, HR/PUB/12/4 UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATION Sales No. E.12.XIV.1 ISBN-13: 978-92-1-154194-6, 
eISBN-13: 978-92-1-055972-0, See page 82 at: 
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/RightDevelopmentInteractive_EN.pdf   
164 Petito F. (2009) Dialogue of Civilizations as an Alternative Model for World Order. In: Michael M.S., Petito F. 
(eds) Civilizational Dialogue and World Order. Culture and Religion in International Relations. Palgrave Macmillan, 
New York at: https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9780230621602_3#citeas See page 51; See also Niall 
Ferguson versus Fareed Zakaria: Is the Liberal International Order Over? In Munk Debates at: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ifGxnlu94hQ  
165 Francis Fukuyama, 1989, The End of History? The National Interest, Summer at: 
https://www.embl.de/aboutus/science_society/discussion/discussion_2006/ref1-22june06.pdf  
166 Samuel Huntington, 1993 / Book 1996 The Clash of Civilizations And the remaking of World Order at: 
https://www.stetson.edu/artsci/political-science/media/clash.pdf - See generally and section on “A MULTIPOLAR, 
MULTICIVILIZATIONAL WORLD” 
167 United Nations A/RES/53/22 United Nations Year of Dialogue among Civilizations at: 
https://undocs.org/A/RES/53/22 -- calling inter alia on governments and partners “to plan and implement 
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Khatami’s Dialogical approach presented an alternate paradigm for IR to critically examine and 
replace IR based on the discourse of power, with an approach of empathy and compassion.”168 
In 2005, UNSG Kofi Annan set up the Alliance of Civilizations (UNAOC) in direct riposte to 
Huntington’s argument on the inevitability of civilizations clashing. Noting, as Huntington did, 
that the understanding and definition of “civilization” can be flexible to include inter alia, religion, 
culture and tradition, Haynes underlines the positive role UNAOC plays in reaching out to state, 
non-state actors and interfaith groups to roll back a putative or real ‘clash of civilizations’, and 
instead develop enhanced dialogue between cultural and religious groups for mutual, long-term 
benefit.”169  
 
Sergei explains the ‘Dialogue of Civilizations’ (DoC) called for a re-discussion of the core Western-
centric and liberal global order as a powerful normative challenge to contemporary political 
orthodoxy.170 Dugin explains that the coming of multi-polarism seems not to be unexpected, or 
indeed not unwanted, by the US171 noting that former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright 
clarified the US did not want a [US-led] unipolar world, and that economic integration had already 
created "a certain world that can be even called multipolar”. He further notes that the US 
National Intelligence Council "Global Trends 2025" report foresees the emergence of a "global 
                                                          
appropriate cultural, educational and social programmes to promote the concept of dialogue among civilizations, 
including through organizing conferences and seminars and disseminating information and scholarly material on 
the subject, and to inform the Secretary-General of their activities;”; See also GA/9747 Press Release, 5 
SEPTEMBER 1998.   
168 Jeffrey Haynes, May 1 2018, Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilizations’ Today: Responses and Developments at: 
https://www.e-ir.info/2018/05/01/huntingtons-clash-of-civilizations-today-responses-and-developments/  See 
page 4.  
169 Idem note 168 at pages 4- 5.   
170 Sergei 2013, A ‘Dialogue Of Civilizations’ As A Theoretical Model For A Multipolar World Order At: 
Https://Www.Geopolitica.Ru/En/Article/Dialogue-Civilizations-Theoretical-Model-Multipolar-World-Order; He 
notes that events following September 11, 2001 and the subsequent 2003 War in Iraq represented a “Clash of 
Civilizations” led by the then Bush Administration; See also Johan Eriksson, The ‘Clash Of Civilizations’ And Its 
Unexpected Liberalism ,Södertöm University, Sweden at: https://www.E-ir.info/2013/03/06/The-Clash-Of-
Civilizations-And-Its-Unexpected-Liberalism/; Interestingly, Erikson counters Sergei by holding that George Bush 
refuted Huntington’s theory, by applying to it a liberal interpretation categorizing the “War on Terrorism” as “In 
truth, […] a struggle for civilization” and therefore not a clash thereof. 
171 A. Dugin, Multipolarity – The Definition and the Differentiation between its Meanings at: 
https://www.geopolitica.ru/en/1290-multipolarity-the-definition-and-the-differentiation-between-its-
meanings.html; REFERRING to the diverse works of Kampf, Kennedy, Walton, Hiro and Petito.  [Dugin can evoke 
passions in some western circles] 
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multipolar system”172 and contends that while the Westphalian system exists de-jure, it no longer 
reflects the real system of international relations and requires revision. He foresees a future with 
a few sovereign, independent centers of global strategic decision-making  able to defend their 
sovereignty in the face of a direct threat, the non-acceptance of universalism of Western 
standards, norms, and values including democracy and human rights , where the sovereignty of 
existing nation-states is not taken seriously but declared only on a purely legal level. Weaker 
nation-states can only achieve sovereignty by combination and coalition of states.173 If even some 
of these contentions were true, how would future dialogue on RTD happen?  
Petito draws on the work of Bull to explain that core assumptions of current Western-centric 
international normative structures need to be revised and welcomes new discussion on Jus 
Gentium influenced by John Rawls’ “The Law of Peoples” advancing a debate that the 
philosophical basis of international theory and practice is “severely limited by --- legal 
positivism…” He emphasizes that a dialogically constituted cross-cultural jus gentium should 
“provide grounds for human creativity to flourish” through a new “normative global synthesis” of 
Buddhist, Hindu and Islamic doctrines with those of the West, balancing the preoccupations of 
autonomy and social order.174 He further stresses that Huntington advocated a “good fences 
make good neighbours” approach to building “walls of containment and separation” while 
“Dialogue of Civilizations” seeks “bridges,” not “walls,” to link multipolarity with a cross-cultural 
jus gentium.175  
                                                          
172 Idem note 171 [Dugin] at page 1, Dugin also cites former Vice President Joseph Biden, during his visit to Ukraine 
in 2009 as saying “We’re trying to build a multipolar world”; See also Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World, 
United States  National Intelligence Council at: www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_2025_project.html; He notes that U.S. 
President Barack Obama was the harbinger of an "era of multipolarity" seeking to orient U.S. foreign policy priority 
to rising BRICS powers.   
173 Idem note 171 [Dugin] at pages 1, 6-7 
174 Idem note 164 [Petito] at page 56, 57 and 59. See also interview with Fabio Petito on Huntington, Multipolarity 
and Modernization, Dialogue of Civilizations Research Institute, Published on Jul 3, 2018 at: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vs_TigNcFgA&index=3&list=PLF1usGzxawczGPaHPIxdRiusbn05ppE6D; J. Paul 
Barker [Series Editor] 2013 - The Clash of Civilizations Twenty Years On, Published by e-International Relations 
(Bristol, UK) ISSN 2053-8626 at: https://www.e-ir.info/publication/huntingtons-clash-of-civilizations-twenty-years-
on/; Dieter Senghass 2013, University Of Bremen, Germany, How To Promote A Perspicacious Intercultural 
Dialogue? The Clash of Civilizations Twenty Years On, Published by e-International Relations (Bristol, UK) at: 
https://www.e-ir.info/2013/02/22/how-to-promote-a-perspicacious-intercultural-dialogue/ October 2013, ISSN 
2053-8626, [ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/ ]     
175 Idem note 164 [Petito] at page 59.  
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Arevalo-Carpenter explains that societies around the world are embracing populism and short-
term thinking in a very human response to the unknown176 while   Brysk stresses the future lies 
in human rights as political practice and less through application of legal principle. ”177 Clapham 
states that “Human rights do not really resolve the tension between competing interests and 
various visions of how the world should be; rather, human rights ideas provide the vocabulary for 
arguing about which interests should prevail and how to constrain attacks on dignity.”178 He sees 
participation in the human rights [RTD] discussion and argument as a necessarily inclusive one 
across global geography and cultures so as to have a secure mooring and stresses the 
advancement of human rights is a political issue due to the power relationships involved at both 
national and international levels.179 However he clearly warns that States, left to their own 
devices, will never put aside their economic and foreign policy interests in “apolitical assessments 
of the human rights behavior of other states.”180  
 
Moving the SDGs towards the Right to Development? 
 
At face value, the moral and political dimensions of RTD’s core elements were broadly promoted 
in September 2015 when all 193 Member States of the United Nations adopted Agenda 2030.181 
This builds on 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) as a collective journey to end extreme 
poverty, fight inequality and injustice, and protect our planet.182 States also expressed their 
                                                          
176 Michelle Arevalo-Carpenter Chief Executive Officer and Co-founder, IMPAQTO, Politics, the Fourth Industrial 
Revolution and how business can make the world more humane – at 
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/01/reactionary-politics-the-fourth-industrial-revolution-and-the-role-of-
business-in-a-more-humane-future/   
177The Future of Human Rights, Twenty First Century Global Dynamics, January 5, 2017|Volume10 |Issue1 at 
http://www.21global.ucsb.edu/global-e/january-2017/future-human-rights   
178 Andrew Clapham, Human Rights, A Very Short Introduction, Oxford University Press, 2007, 2015, reference the 
Preface in both editions. He believes human rights frameworks have power to shape a better future and that 
human rights language is a means to argue and clarify claims and counter claims to rights and interests on a wide 
vision of CPR and ESCR. 
179 Idem note 177 [Clapham] at page 122.   
180 Idem note177 [Clapham] see Final Remarks pages 161-165.   
181Karin Arts, Atabongawung Tamo: The Right to Development in International Law: New Momentum Thirty Years 
Down the Line? at: Neth Int Law Rev (2016) 63:221–249 at: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40802-016-
0066-x  
182 Idem note 181[Arts and Tamo] at page 229 – See footnote 34 referring to South Centre, ‘The Right to 
Development at 30: Looking Back and Forward’, South News, no. 107, 17 June 2016, http://us5.campaign-
archive2.com/?u=fa9cf38799136b5660f367ba6&id=3a9a00a980 – on its page 6. According to Khor, ‘[t]here is a 
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determination ‘to mobilize the means required to implement this Agenda through a revitalized 
Global Partnership for Sustainable Development, based on a spirit of strengthened global 
solidarity.183 Developed inclusively with Governments, business, civil society and citizens, the 17 
SDGs, 169 targets and 230 indicators cover poverty, health, education, water and sanitation, but 
also inequalities, gender, climate and institutions. However, McInerney-Lankford points out the 
SDGs themselves do not contain any references to human rights or international law. She 
highlights that while the SDGs are a significant advance on the MDGs in human rights terms, 
substantive advances are limited to ad hoc references to human rights principles in the SDG 
Declaration and in certain SDG Targets and Indicators. That the SDGs are not indexed to, and in 
essence are disconnected from international law and human rights law norms.184 This she notes 
would indicate accountability underpinning the SDGs is diffuse and political rather than legal, 
reflecting the fragmentation of international law and an absence of international policy 
coherence between human rights [notably RTD] and development.185   
 
Arts and Tamo acknowledge the protracted debate on RTD is in stalemate at global level.186 They 
recommend the best fallback position from a binding Convention on RTD at global level is to focus 
on the core elements of RTD which already exist in international law provisions, and to seek to 
revitalize and realize RTD through mobilizing these.  They recommend focus on:   
 
 a better understanding of the law on international cooperation and related 
obligations, especially as taken up by UN human rights treaty bodies;  
                                                          
close connection between the Right to Development and the SDGs. Fulfilling the SDGs would go a long way to 
realizing the right to development’ 
183Historic New Sustainable Development Agenda Unanimously Adopted by 193 UN Members at: 
http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2015/09/historic-new-sustainable-development-agenda-
unanimously-adopted-by-193-un-members/     
184 Siobhán McInerney-Lankford, 6th January 2017, Human Rights and the SDGs: Progress or a Missed 
Opportunity? At: http://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/human-rights-and-the-sdgs-progress-or-a-missed-opportunity/ See 
pages 1-2  
185 Idem Note 184 [McInerney-Lankford] page 2; See also Marjan Ajevski (2014) Fragmentation in International 
Human Rights Law – Beyond Conflict of Laws, Nordic Journal of Human Rights at: 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/270812975_Fragmentation_in_International_Human_Rights_Law_-
_Beyond_Conflict_of_Laws    
186 Idem note 181 [Arts and Tamo] at Conclusion.  
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 creating accountability processes, which include monitoring the extent to which 
States actually perform their RTD obligations; and 
 
 learning from regional experiences on concretizing RTD most notably in the 
African regional system.” 187 
 
Following the same logic, De Feyter recalls differing interpretations of the 2016 HRC Resolution 
4/4 where NAM pushed for a new RTD Treaty emphasizing the need to address inequalities in 
the international financial system and greater participation of the South in global decision-
making on economic policy and fairer trade.188 The EU opposed an international legal standard 
of a binding nature, favoring the elaboration of benchmarks and indicators instead, highlighting 
that IHRL only recognized clearly that States have obligations with regard to persons falling under 
their national jurisdiction. They also stressed the need for suitable domestic conditions in 
developing countries including good governance, democracy and responsible economic 
management. De Feyter’s best option in these circumstances is the elaboration of a Framework 
Convention as a general system of governance for RTD, to complement the current human rights 
regime.189 However, and notwithstanding the strong merits of these two approaches, and the 
necessity, it is held, that they are indeed pursued with great energy, the very need for them as 
fallback positions to a Convention-based RTD after 32 years of global impasse brings us back to 
                                                          
187 Idem note 181 [Arts and Tamo] at page 247, footnote 114 – referring to Fantu Cheru (2016) Developing 
countries and the right to development: a retrospective and prospective African view. Third World Q 37:1268–
1283 that: ‘the UN Charter and the accompanying two human rights covenants establish the foundations for an 
ethical system of global governance’. 
188 HRC Council resolution 4/4, 30 March 2007 at: http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/alldocs.aspx?doc_id=13040  
189 Koen De Feyter 2013  - Towards A Framework Convention On The Right To Development,  Friedrich-Ebert-
Stiftung | Global Policy and Development, Hiroshimastraße 28 | 10785 Berlin | Germany at: 
http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/genf/09892.pdf; Such a Treaty would go beyond individual State 
responsibility and venture into areas and principles of international development such as mutual accountability, 
alignment of policies among partner countries, and inclusive partnerships. See also Framework 
Convention/Protocol Approach, January 1999, Report number: Who/Ncd/Tfi/99.1affiliation: World Health 
Organization – See Introduction: What is a framework convention? at: 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/289507490_Framework_ConventionProtocol_Approach    
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geopolitical boxing matches regarding divisions between North and south on RTD which seem 
not to be going away anytime soon.  
This whole area of attention fell under former Millennium Development Goal [MDG] 8 of the 
Global Partnership for Development, “the most neglected of all MDGs”.190 In looking ahead to 
SDG 17: Revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development, Razavi notes that like the 
MDGs, the SDGs are relatively silent on the policies needed to achieve the Goals and targets set 
in Agenda 2030. He notes the so-called “means of implementation” [MOI] were defined and 
included in the SDGs on the insistence of developing countries both for goals (17) and targets.191 
Reddy and Kvangraven emphasize MOIs vary greatly, some so vague that they are practically 
meaningless, while others are too specific.192   
 
SDG 17 speaks of partnerships between governments, the private sector and civil society, 
principles and values, a shared vision and shared goals that place people and the planet at the 
centre. It calls on action to mobilize, redirect and unlock the transformative power of trillions of 
dollars of private resources and long-term investments, including FDI needed in developing 
countries which require clear direction from the public sector. It aims to retool review and 
monitoring frameworks, and oversight mechanisms, and strengthen regulatory and incentive 
structures to enable and attract investments.193 However, it is submitted here, the key element 
of Goal 17 where implementing RTD is concerned is the “Systemic issues” and their relation to 
targets set for “Finance” and “Trade”.  The “systemic issues” read: 
 
                                                          
190Idem note 181 [Arts and Tamo] at page 239. 
 191Shahra Razavi (2016) The 2030 Agenda: challenges of implementation to attain gender equality and women's 
rights, Gender & Development, 24:1, 25-41, DOI: 10.1080/13552074.2016.1142229  at: https://policy-
practice.oxfam.org.uk/publications/the-2030-agenda-challenges-of-implementation-to-attain-gender-equality-
and-wome-599230  
192 Sanjay G. Reddy and Ingrid Harvold Kvangraven, Global Development Goals: If At All, Why, When and How? At 
https://www.economicpolicyresearch.org/media/k2/attachments/NSSR_WP_232015.pdf; However, they 
acknowledge that because MoI address substantive policy alternatives, achieving consensus is bound to be divisive.  
193 See SDG 17: Revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development at: 
https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/globalpartnerships/   
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 Enhance global macroeconomic stability, including through policy coordination and policy 
coherence 
 Enhance policy coherence for sustainable development 
 Respect each country’s policy space and leadership to establish and implement policies 
for poverty eradication and sustainable development.194 
 
These three lines of text in SGD 17 represent the key substantive content of the North-South 
political and ideological controversy regarding RTD. Lack of agreement on these issues is the 
reason for the long-lived difficulty in codifying and formally implementing RTD as a human right. 
Lack of agreement also represents the extant clash of ideologies, if not indeed of civilizations, 
that has been going on for so long on RTD. It remains for future Dialogue under SGD 17 to 
determine if developing countries will achieve a right to development aid? or if the predominant 
macroeconomic model for the remainder of Agenda 2030 will be a Western-based free market 
neoliberal model? if Keynesian economics find their way back to some extent? or if some other 
middle ground will appear? Dialogue under SDG 17 should also address whether IFIs will integrate 
human rights more uniformly? whether foreign aid becomes a free-for-all serving self-interest? 
and if MNCs agree to be regulated?  
   
Contours of NIEO from 2019 - post-Westphalia? 
   
The resolution of North-South differences regarding RTD as outlined rests squarely on the 
evolution of the NIEO debate, and on how the SDGs are taken forward. In this context, there are 
at least two elephants in the room or two ongoing boxing matches.195 The first is the controversy 
on the relevance of the Westphalian IL-IR model with its Western-value systems of world legal 
and socio-economic order and policies in a globalized world which favours non-specific, non-
static readings of structure and relations.196 The second is the increasingly charged strategic 
rivalry between the United States and China. In parallel, Apodaca notes the global environment 
is shaped by the primary reason States provide development aid i.e. pursuit of their own foreign 
policy goals, predominantly to promote geostrategic interests. While conceding State policy can 
also include altruistic motivations including increasing human welfare in line with Agenda 
                                                          
194 Idem note 193 [SDG 17] at “Systemic Issues”  
195 Some suggest “bull in a China Shop” as the better idiom.  
196He Fan & Ye Qianlin, World Economic Order: Present and Future at: http://csis.org/analysis/parallel-perspectives-
global-economic-order  
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2030,197 she states the only differences between traditional [DAC] and nontraditional 
[China/BRICS] donors is that the latter generally do not place conditionality on their loans, and 
have strong self-interest requiring “return” on their foreign aid investments.198 Following the 
reign of Washington Consensus orthodoxy, Lopes welcomes the contemporary blossoming of 
alternatives and the refreshing variety of approaches with new theories evolving to keep pace 
with the fluidity of globalization.199 However, he underscores this signals the demise of Western 
ideology in guiding policy-making and that the return of State intervention [Keynesian 
economics] to correct market failures is inevitable.200   
 
The Westphalian Model 
 
Conceptually defined as “a society of states based on the principle of territorial sovereignty”, 
Mulcaire notes the Westphalian Model also entails the principles of legal equality, autonomy and 
non-intervention in the affairs of other states.201 Harris explains these characteristics represent 
                                                          
197 Clair Apodaca 2017, Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy Tool, Oxford Research Encyclopedias, Politics, Apr 2017 DOI: 
10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.332 See Summary and Keywords, and Conclusions, for key points. This is 
consistent with formal donor policy e.g. within OSEC or at country level DFID at: 
http://oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-332  
198 Idem note 197 [Apodaca] see page 4 citing Bigsten, Platteau, and Tengstan (2011) estimated that if the European 
Union countries were to choose to optimize the distribution of foreign aid for the sole motive of reducing poverty, 
they would need to reallocate $19 billion of the $27 billion of EU aid—that is, over 70% of EU foreign aid—directing 
it to only the 20 poorest countries. Bigsten et al. (2011) determined that “the reallocation would lead to a modest 
increase of poverty among the donor darlings and a large decline in poverty in the orphan countries” (p. 11). 
However, the EU countries do not wish to optimize their foreign aid because they have economic and political 
purposes other than poverty reduction when they allocate aid. She notes that poverty reduction, good governance, 
and the growth of democracy in developing states are in the national interests of traditional DAC states but the 
growth of nontraditional donors and their resistance to imposing democratic and human rights conditionality on 
their lending may further reduce foreign aid to self-interested motivations of commercial or political interests. 
199Idem note 46 [Lopes] paragraph 47, page 7.  
200 Idem note 46 [Lopes] paragraph 43, page 7  referring to Ha-Joon Chang 2010 who noted in relation to South Korea 
that “industrial policy is conspicuous by its absence,” reminding us that “sustainable export success over a long 
period of time… requires protection and nurturing of ‘infant industries’ through selective industrial policy, rather 
than free trade and deregulation.” In contrast to the “one size fits all” approach promoted by the Washington-based 
institutions, Koreans speak of a “dynamic iPhone model” or “a set of development apps for every occasion, drawn 
from successful approaches in different countries” See Chang, Ha-Joon (2010), “It’s time to reject the Washington 
Consensus,” The Guardian, 9 November at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/nov/09/time-to-
reject-washington-seoul-g20; However, all schools of economic thought are still dominant in contemporary debate. 
Keynes demand side economics and role of the State; Fredrick Hayek’s supply side freedom theory, today’s dominate 
model, whereby the free operation of markets needs to be allowed to balance the economy while the State  provides 
the legal framework for this to operate. Marx is also in critical review again, not for his communist manifesto but for 
his insights into the weaknesses of capitalism. 
201 Camille Mulcaire 2014, How ‘Westphalian’ is the Westphalian Model? at: 
https://www.printfriendly.com/p/g/VtGZcu See page  1, referring to the definition of Evans and Newman: Evans, G. 
& Newnham, J. (1990) The Dictionary of World Politics: A Reference Guide to Concepts, Ideas and Institutions, Hemel 
Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf,  and to Article 2.7 of the UN Charter.  
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the foundations of all international order-building projects since the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, 
up to todays’ dominant liberal international order.202 These order-projects include: (i) the 
Concert of Europe 1815, when European powers agreed to reorganize the political map of Europe 
and develop a system of conflict resolution to preserve peace and balance of power to end the 
Napoleonic wars; (ii) the “Pax Britannica” (1815–1914), where informally recognized “Great 
Powers” and their international jurists justified colonization around the globe on a Westphalian 
value-system of civilization. This period increasingly led by Europe and the US witnessed growing 
free trade, IL development and globalization;203 (iii) strengthening US leadership in 20th century 
under the [ill-fated] League of Nations,204 the post-WWII formation of the UN and Bretton Woods 
Institutions, and  subsequently, the West’s embrace of individual human rights “as a cornerstone 
of the international community.”205   
 
In tracing this evolution, Kayaoglu explains that because natural law was the dominant 
international legal regime of the 17th century, Westphalian narrative as we know it did not 
emerge until well after the 1648 Peace. Natural law connecting justice and morality was assumed 
to come from a transcendental source above states. This gave it a universal character, valid for 
everyone, everywhere, all the time. These qualities allowed it to transcend political boundaries 
or inter-state treaties in a context where international society was assumed to exist naturally, 
albeit in a state of anarchy, with no concept of sovereignty outside the domestic realm.206 
Hobbes’s Leviathan espoused natural law based on “realism” and “social contract theory” among 
suitably situated rational, free, and equal persons where people and States existed in a “State of 
Nature” based on constant war and anarchy in which individuals should submit to the authority 
of an “absolute—undivided and unlimited sovereign power.” The source of law and therefore 
authority was vested in the domestic sovereign for whom no equivalent existed in the 
                                                          
202 Idem note 43 [Harris 2015]  
203 The Century of Peace | Boundless World History at: https://courses.lumenlearning.com/boundless-
worldhistory/chapter/the-century-of-peace/;   
204 Despite President Wilson’s leadership, the United States did not join the League of Nations.  
205 Idem note 43 [Harris] at page 3.   
206Turan Kayaoglu, 2010, Westphalian Eurocentrism in International Relations Theory, International Studies Review 
( 193–217) at:  https://www.jstor.org/stable/40730727?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents  
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international arena.207 However, with the menace of Napoleonic imperialism, German States 
found no defense of their sovereign jurisdictions in natural law which was unable to clarify 
doctrines of sovereign recognition and sovereign territoriality.208Their solution to ward off 
Napoleon came with the transformation from natural law to legal positivism in late 18th and 19th 
century. Here, Vattel’s “The Law of Nations” placed State sovereignty at the centre in 
international law through adding an external dimension to domestic sovereignty. Thus the State 
became the sovereign representative of a country’s population, and the “external” or foreign 
influence was excluded from domestic authority structures by the sovereign. This construct 
became known as Westphalian sovereignty with States as sole subjects of the law of nations.209  
 
However, Mulcaire notes, these post 1648 political constructs were in fact not Westphalian in 
their essential characteristics. Hierarchy and not sovereign equality was the 17th century political 
construct, and the word sovereignty was never actual used in the either of the treaties signed in 
1648.210 She also cites Krasner to highlight that permanent membership of the UN Security 
Council today is evidence of sovereign inequality, which in Westphalian terms might be 
understood as an example of “organised hypocrisy”.211 In this regard, revisionist scholars 
including Osiander support the view that the Westphalian IR narrative is in fact a “myth” with no 
relation to the actual Peace of Westphalia from which the model derives its name.212 
Nonetheless, and despite the myth, Harris notes the Westphalian attributed elements of 
international order are the most widely accepted rules of IR today. He also stresses this is not the 
case for the liberal components of world management associated with free trade, democratic 
                                                          
207 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Hobbes's Moral and Political Philosophy First published Tue Feb 12, 2002; 
substantive revision Mon Apr 30, 2018 at: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hobbes-moral/ See generally and 
page 5 where it notes Hobbes’ “essential rights of sovereignty” and the idea that to refer resolution of [a] question 
to some further authority, itself also limited and so open to challenge for overstepping its bounds, would be to 
initiate an infinite regress of non-authoritative ‘authorities’ (where the buck never stops). 
208 Idem note 206 [Turan Kayaoglu] at page 198-199 and 194 on German worries regarding Napoleonic 
imperialism. Also page 194 where he states that Westphalian sovereignty is a misnomer.   
209 Idem note 206 [Turan Kayaoglu] at page 198.  
210 Idem note 201 [Camille Mulcaire] pages 1-3  
211  Idem note 201 [Camille Mulcaire] citing Krasner, S.D. (1999) Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy, Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press.  
212 Idem note 201 [Camille Mulcaire ] citing  Osiander, A. (2001) ‘Sovereignty, International Relations, and the 
Westphalian Myth’ in International  Organization, Vol. 55: 2 
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government, national self-determination, adherence to international law and respect for human 
rights, which are cherished only by a Western sub-set of the whole.213  
 
But why, if the Westphalia model is a myth with little relation to the 1648 Peace is it promoted 
as if it has?  Kayaoglu explains that scholars sought to perpetuate European-Western 
exceptionalism to elevate Western ideas and ideals within a Westphalian narrative of superiority 
and exclusivity in relation to other orders elsewhere in the world.214 Citing justifying the 
colonization of Africa under the Berlin Conference as an example, he notes States and scholars 
created a strategic normative hierarchy where “Western states produce norms, principles, and 
institutions of international society - and non-Western states lack these until they are socialized 
into the norms, principles, and institutions of international society.”215 Similarly, the “English 
School” or ‘‘International Society Approach’’ scholars coopted the Westphalia narrative during 
decolonization to help protect and sustain European imperialist interests against a post-colonial, 
non-Western revolt [such as NIEO essentially was], challenging Western dominance and 
values.216  Once the West secured the concept that accepted international society was based on 
European history and values, any non-Western disagreement with the West was taken as a revolt 
against Western values, and by extension, against international society. Similarly, on the flipside, 
where non-Western societies ‘‘fulfilled’’ so-called ‘‘standards of civilization,’’ the European states 
then ‘‘admitted’’ them into ‘‘international society.’’ Constructivist scholars also place a European 
geographical limit on norms and doctrine for human rights and exclude the possibility of accepted 
international norms having emanated from anywhere else such as for example China or the 
Ottoman Empire. These Eurocentric Westphalian models create an us-and-them, Western-
Westphalia-In-Group who are good -- and a Non-Western-Out-Group which by Westphalian logic 
                                                          
213 Idem note 43 [Harris] at page 4. 
214 Idem note 206 [Turan Kayaoglu] at page 196-199 
215 Idem note 206 [Turan Kayaoglu] see page 204. Doctrines like Westphalian sovereignty that dispossessed non-
Western rights or through extraterritoriality policies that limited non-Western legal authority, or acted as 
apologists for Europe’s excessive brutality in the name of its civilizing mission and expansion of international 
society. In sum, international jurists were often complicit in, and frequently ardent supporters of, European 
colonialism. 
216Idem note 206 [Turan Kayaoglu] at page 206 citing Callahan, William A. (2004) Nationalising International 
Theory: Race, Class and the English School. Global Society 18(4): 305–323. 
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are bad, and will remain bad until they change their ways and accept and practice the norms of 
the Westphalia-in-group.217 
 
Harris notes that today, Westphalian fixation has created a cleavage in world politics between 
Russia, China and other non-liberal States which are often exasperated by Westphalian 
exclusivity and superiority, and defenders of the Westphalia paradigm.218 Lechner notes the 
inability of the international community to manage major problems of environmental pollution, 
financial crises, crime, and underdevelopment, which are seen by theorists of globalization as a 
failing of the Westphalian model of international anarchy [Hobbesian] which prioritizes security 
over economic issues, and privileges the sovereign state in a context of an increasingly 
interdependent globalized world.219 Kayaoglu tells us this distorts our understanding of modern 
international systems and leads to misdiagnoses, prevents theorizing of cross-civilizational, cross-
regional interdependencies and accommodation of pluralism which is inherent to a globalized 
world.220  As Krasner put it, “compromising” Westphalia is essential in order to gain a valid and 
more imaginative globalization and growing interdependence.221 Cutler notes Westphalian 
inspired notions of state-centricity, positivist international law, and “public” definitions of 
                                                          
217  Idem note 206 [Turan Kayaoglu] see page 196 
218 Idem note 43 [Harris] at page 4. 
219 Silviya Lechner 2017, Anarchy in International Relations - Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies 
page 17, Citing Held, D. (1995). Democracy and the global order: From the modern state to cosmopolitan 
governance; Oxford: Polity Press; Held, D., & McGrew, A. (2007). Globalization/anti-globalization: Beyond the great 
divide (2d ed.).Cambridge, U.K.: Polity Press. At: 
http://oxfordindex.oup.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.79 See generally and page 17.  
220 Idem note 206 [Turan Kayaoglu] - See at Introduction and pages 195-196. 
221 Krasner, S.D. (1995) ‘Compromising Westphalia’ in International Security, Vol. 20: 3 See generally and 
Conclusions at page 151 “Compromising Westphalia is not only inevitable, it can also be good. Explicitly 
recognizing that different principles ought to vary with the capacity and behavior of states would not only make 
normative discourse more consistent with empirical reality, it would also contribute to the more imaginative 
construction of institutional forms-forms that compromise Westphalia that  could create a more stable and 
peaceful international system. at:  
https://www.google.com/search?q=Krasner%2C+S.D.+(1995)+%E2%80%98Compromising+Westphalia%E2%80%99
+in+International+Security%2C+Vol.+20%3A+3&rlz=1C1GGRV_enTD803TD803&oq=Krasner%2C+S.D.+(1995)+%E2
%80%98Compromising+Westphalia%E2%80%99+in+International+Security%2C+Vol.+20%3A+3&aqs=chrome..69i5
7.2825j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8  
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authority are incapable of capturing the significance of non-state actors, informal normative 
structures, and private, economic power in the global political economy.”222  
 
Lechner explains further that theories formulated within economics such as “hegemonic 
stability”, “complex interdependence” and “globalization” currently represent world politics as a 
“global political economy” or global hierarchy. Conversely, international law favours 
conceptualizing in terms of anarchy. Noting that “international anarchy presupposes the 
institution of government and…the sovereign state as a public and centralized form of 
government”, Lechner cites Lake’s contention that state sovereignty, international security and 
even legitimacy are economic “goods” to be traded against each other in “great power 
management globally”. In stark contrast, International Law holds sovereignty and rules of 
peaceful coexistence to be values which are protected and not subject to trade-offs on the 
international scene. Whereas economics can produce the image of a single, borderless global 
economy, international law cannot. Where hierarchy [economics] may emerge within the global 
economic system simply because economic reasoning may dictate that hierarchy provides the 
best value maximization, international law [anarchy] is radically different with its strict territorial 
and normative juridical independent units [States].223 Therefore, the concept of global 
governance can be seen as the expression of a gradual departure from the classic Westphalian 
system towards a less conflictual, more cooperative and consensual system. 
 
                                                          
222 Claire Cutler 2001, Critical Reflections on the Westphalian Assumptions of International Law and Organization: 
A Crisis of Legitimacy.  Review of International Studies, Vol. 27, No. 2 (Apr., 2001), pp. 133-150 at: 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20097724   
223  Idem note 219 [Silviya Lechner] at pages 16-18. 
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The United States, China and Westphalia 
  
As noted earlier, the evolution of the rivalry between the United States and China as two major 
world powers or poles, and their different approaches to human rights and economics, are 
pivotal to the future RTD and its implementation. As to the legal perspectives and best means for 
implementing RTD at the global level by all countries, it is recognized there needs to be a 
multifaceted approach where the option of a binding international convention either for a 
specific right or a framework treaty, should be seen in the context of a range of alternative 
approaches for meeting the intention of paragraph 2 (d) of Human Rights Council resolution 
4/4.224 In this optic, attainments in realising ESCR and CPR by individuals and groups contribute 
directly to the realisation of the composite right to development.225 However, the Independent 
Expert [RTD] has argued that focusing on the policies to eradicate poverty as a multidimensional 
phenomenon which constitutes a denial of RTD is an appropriate means, and suggested here, a 
fundamental pillar of action for the international community, to secure the right to devel-
opment.226  
 
For future progress on poverty reduction as a means to implement RTD, and given their heavily 
weighted influence on global economics, it is paramount to have agreement between the United 
States and China (EU and others), on the doctrine, substantive content, policies and modalities 
of implementing RTD. Whether such an outcome is realistic and achievable within the current 
definition of RTD in the Declaration is doubtful, given the current state of play with advancing US 
and Chinese traditions as stated earlier. However, there is ample opportunity to further explore 
common ground to meet the intention of paragraph 2 (d) of Human Rights Council resolution 4/4 
including by consolidating, updating and revising the 1986 Declaration on RTD, preparing new 
guidelines or recommendations for implementing the Declaration, concluding development 
                                                          
224 Stephen P. Marks, Beate Rudolf, Koen De Feyter and Nicolaas Schrijver, 2013, The role of international law, 
Concluding statement of the Expert Meeting on legal perspectives involved in implementing the right to 
development, in “Realizing the Right to Development - Essays in Commemoration of 25 Years of the United 
Nations Declaration on the Right to Development”, HR/PUB/12/4 UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATION Sales No. 
E.12.XIV.1 ISBN-13: 978-92-1-154194-6, eISBN-13: 978-92-1-055972-0, See page 468 
225 Idem note  163 [Sengupta] 2013 pages 67-90 
226 Idem note 163 [Sengupta] page 75 
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compacts or multi-stakeholder agreements involving international organizations, enterprises, 
commercial banks and civil society organizations, and mainstreaming the Declaration into 
regional and interregional agreements.227  
 
In this context, it is held here, the economic relations and the progressive evolution of economic 
doctrine and policy between these two countries in particular is THE strategically important 
dossier where RTD is concerned. The US tradition of focusing on individual civil and political rights 
(not economic rights), liberalized markets and Washington Consensus economic policies does 
not, in principle, support China’s communitarian value system approach which prioritizes 
economic and social rights and strong advocacy for RTD - in its own way – as the most important 
right. Then, to achieve consensus between these countries on RTD requires for each to stand 
back, and then re-engage in new dialogue to achieve an understanding of and respect for their 
different traditions and how they can find their own rationales for what Rawls terms an 
‘‘overlapping consensus’’ on the substance of international society, and human rights [RTD].228  
 
In this regard, Du notes that China’s emerging power poses challenges to Western-neoliberal 
value-based international economic legal order (IELO) through its unique socialist market 
economy “Melding the power of the authoritarian state with the power of capitalism.”229 
Appeasing western fears that China may be a disruptive force to IELO, Du explains that China has 
conformed to the existing IELO paradigm which (so far) has not changed because of an 
economically dominant China. Contrasting the Washington-Consensus approach with its invisible 
(market) hand and too little government intervention, with China’s too visible hand and too much 
government intervention, he cites Peerenboom’s and Gruin’s argument that neither the China 
nor US/IELO models can be static but must constantly adjust and adapt to changing 
                                                          
227 Idem Stephen P. Marks, Beate Rudolf, Koen De Feyter and Nicolaas Schrijver, 2013 at page 468 
228 Idem note 206 [Turan Kayaoglu] - page 214.  
229 Ming Du, University of Lancaster, Social & Legal studies 25(1), book review on Lisa Toohey, Colin B Picker And 
Jonathan Greenacre (eds) China In The International Economic Order: New Diratections And Changing Paradigms, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 344, ISBN: 9781107062016 at: 
http://journals.sagepub.com/action/ssostart?redirectUri=/action/ssostart;  See pages 123-124,   
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circumstances, where both normative theoretical foundations are malleable and open to 
contestation.230 
 
Also, the political discourses of the US and China at Davos, respectively, in 2017 by Xi Jinping and 
Donald Trump in 2018 had, arguably, more points of commonality than of divergence, both 
speaking to a shared future, dreams, and a better world and better lives for all. However, 
overtones of dissatisfaction by each, China alluding to the US imposing its development path on 
others, the US referring to unfair trade practices by China have, at the time of writing, evolved 
into a Trade-War between them, currently in ceasefire, pending further discussion.231   
 
Kayaoglu stresses that Westphalian narrative inhibits the legitimacy and efficacy of the notion of 
international society because of its bias in designating ‘‘the West’’ as primary creator of ideas of 
international society, while non-western States must be coerced and coaxed into conforming and 
complying with these ideas.  He emphasizes that a truly global international society needs to 
appeal to and be affirmed by diverse traditions, such as the Chinese, Indian, Jewish, and 
Islamic.232 Ling notes that Westphalian [US] IR cannot conclude otherwise; China poses a threat 
                                                          
230 Idem note 229 [Ming Du] 
231 World Economic Forum - President Xi's speech to Davos 2017 in full at: 
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/01/full-text-of-xi-jinping-keynote-at-the-world-economic-forum/; and 
World Economic Forum - President Donald Trump's Davos 2018 address in full at: 
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/01/president-donald-trumps-davos-address-in-full-8e14ebc1-79bb-4134-
8203-95efca182e94/; See also Donald Trump and Xi Jinping declare trade truce at G20 at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/dec/02/donald-trump-and-xi-jinping-declare-trade-truce-at-g20; While 
its frustration with the Western neoliberal approach is now clear, some analysts believe China wants to impose its 
own vision, not only to reshape but to redefine the global economic order by establishing new institutions such as 
the AIIB to influence how financial aid is offered; Nicolas contends however that despite not having a seat at the 
table in the past, and the temptation to go it alone now as problems with Western-neo-liberal policies are exposed, 
China still believes the multilateral approach is the better choice over bilateral engagements in pursuit of its own 
interests, even if it shies away from Western type regulation – See Françoise Nicolas, « China and the Global 
Economic Order », China Perspectives [Online], 2016/2 at: http://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/6960  
at page 9 and footnote 18, and Conclusions. “Recent years have seen a new trend appear: China has begun to take 
an increasingly offensive stance, marked by a degree of revisionism.”  It is also gaining more traction through 
improved voting rights in IMF and World Bank; seeking a fundamental reform of the international monetary system 
with the yuan now the fifth international reserve currency, and making agreements with trade partners which are 
based on Chinese direct investment in a country, and China’s importing of basic commodities from that same 
country.     
232 Idem note 206 [Turan Kayaoglu] See Conclusion at page 214 
65 
 
to the West!  A “China Threat Thesis.”233 That Westphalia binary logic provides a zero-sum 
calculus of inevitable clash and or exclusion, unless China concedes to Western standards.234 In 
this regard, she notes that while former Secretary for State Clinton insisted the US had no wish 
or intention to impose its system on other countries, and acknowledged that certain values are 
universal and intrinsic to all nations including in Asia, she ended by specifying that world politics 
as we know it reflects “the open and rules-based system that the United States helped to build 
and works to sustain.”235 Ling concludes that to join the Clintonian conception of international 
community, all states must emulate the West – or risk de facto exile and exclusion.236  
 
Examining points of view from both inside China and from diaspora, Ling stresses that when 
Chinese scholars apply the Westphalian logic to China’s own relations with the West, they 
[logically] arrive at the same conclusion as their Western counterparts. The Westphalian binary 
logic provides them the ultimatum of compliance or discipline, clash and exclusion, or compliance 
so as to be allowed into the Club. Ling contends this leads to Chinese frustrations that vary from 
“they (US/West) don’t understand ‘us’ (China/Chinese)” and “they never will”,  to there is “no 
way to become friends”, to the more pointed “infuriating” to see the West use the China threat 
today as it did previously with the “yellow peril.”237 To resolve such differences and 
misunderstanding (perceived or real), which are central to human rights and RTD, Brincat 
                                                          
233 L. H. M. Ling (2013). Worlds beyond Westphalia: Daoist dialectics and the ‘China threat’. Review of International 
Studies, 39, pp 549-568 doi:10.1017/S026021051200054X at: 
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wherewithal to ‘adapt and recover from difficulties [where] many other nations, including its geopolitical 
competitors’ cannot; ‘[i]n the end’, he writes, ‘the decision [about the future of world order] is in the hands of 
Americans’.  
237Idem note 233 [Ling] see pages 554-555 
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explains the use of Dialectics as a possible model for better dialogue between countries.238 Ling 
contends that contrary to Westphalian logic, the Dao Dialectics of Yin-Yang can examine both 
what pushes the two countries apart as well as what binds them together and: (i) does not 
indicate superiority but ontological parity, changes over time and can help reframe the ‘China 
threat’ thesis into a politics of engagement; (ii)239 looks at co-implications of the US and China 
with such examples as China IR scholars being trained primarily in the US and the emergence of 
a new blended US-China elite who could forge a path to mutual understanding and cooperation; 
(iii)  compels to see beyond bilateral relations   to consider the whole of world politics. Looking 
large and away from Hobbesian anarchy, Dao is organic, filled with hybridities, complicities and 
complementarities which organically oblige US-West tradition to engage with China, BRICS and 
NAM tradition to try to find “the way”. 240 What is essential here, whatever the form, whether a 
“Dialogue of Civilisations” or Dao Dialectics,  is the need for new and constructive dialogue where 
both countries may find differences in approach do not necessarily lead to differences in 
outcomes or aspirations.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
238 Shannon Brincat, ‘Towards a Social-Relational Dialectic for World Politics’, European Journal of International 
Relations, 17:4 (December 2011), pp. 679–703. In IR, according to Brincat, ‘[d]ialectics offers…a means to reframe 
the social ontology of world politics, from one of alleged stasis and immutability, to one of process, change and the 
social relations that generate them.’ See Page 680 where she adds: What makes social-relational dialectics such a 
capable method for understanding processes is how it informs on particular phenomena within the totality of social 
relations rather than their isolation or abstraction . . . [Dialectics] provides the contextual analysis of these social 
relations, rendering the interconnectedness between such phenomena and the immanent tendencies for social 
transformation that this engenders. 
239 Idem note 233 [Ling] at pages 564-570.  
240 Idem note 233 [Ling] at page 566, and 558-560.  She notes each nationalist camp expects the other to attack 
with hard or soft power where any negotiations which follow will focus on sovereignty, borders, and national 
security, regardless of any actual collaboration that takes place on the ground. [Dao or “the Way” or ”way making” 
is concerned with change and transformation where polarities [and all things] are viewed as the product of on-
going processes of mutuality, variety and generative unity of polarities; polarities which exist in opposition as well 
as in complement to each other.] 
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The Daoism’s yin-yang diagram encapsulates its philosophy (see Figure 1). 241  
   
  
 
  
Conclusion 
 
RTD as a recognized human right is settled since the consensus achieved by the Vienna 
Declaration and Programme of Action in 1993. However, there are no internationally legally 
binding obligations relating to RTD as defined in the Declaration and therefore a claim to RTD 
cannot be realized in a given institutional set-up (Exception as separately defined at regional 
level). RTD can be a societal goal or abstract right but does not rise to the level of a right proper, 
a “valid right” or a “concrete right” related to any practical social arrangement.242 This 
notwithstanding, its composite nature allows the justiciability of its constituent rights through 
existing human rights treaties while its practical implementation can draw on an extensive and 
evolving global architecture for action.243 In this context, the HLTF on RTD recognizes the greatest 
challenge for the implementation of RTD in theory and practice, is to reconcile the conceptual 
                                                          
241 Idem note 233 [Ling] at pages 559-561 - See Dao Figure and explanation. Ling cites Sunzi see related footnote 
70 
242 Idem note 183 [Sengupta] 2013 pages 67-68 
243 Idem note 163 [Sengupta] 2013 page 75 – Also Idem note 227 [Marks, Rudolf, De Feyter and Schrijver] 2013, 
page 75. 
 Symbolises a method of reasoning that 
systematically interrogates “the interrelations 
among constituent parts and part-whole relations”  
 No categorical “black box” can survive 
 Polarities are mutually created so there is co-
implication within polarities [US and China] 
 There are elements of the One in the Other.  
 No one condition is fixed as intrinsically good or bad, 
desired or repulsed, useful or not. It Depends. 
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approaches of human rights and economics to maximize the well-being of all individuals and 
peoples through sound economic policies that foster development and growth with equity.244 
 
The World Bank warns us that while human development has seen enormous progress in recent 
history,245  a business-as-usual path will not be able to eradicate extreme poverty by 2030.246 In 
December 2018, in the “Henry A. Kissinger Lecture” at the US Library of Congress, IMF Managing 
Director, Christine Lagarde, emphasized that the 2008 global financial crisis reminded the world 
that international cooperation is essential if future global challenges are to be met.247 She 
emphasized that G20 nations, the US Federal Reserve and the IMF acted in concert in 2008 by 
employing extra-ordinary steps to “save the system” and secure the global economy, adapting 
lending instruments, particularly to help low-income countries, but also to craft stronger financial 
sector regulations to prevent future crisis. The extraordinary steps she refers to include at least 
a “brief burst” of Keynesian economics with the interventionist type approaches neo-liberalists 
would normally not endorse, in fact, would dismiss.248 Yet this is what happened post-2008 in 
order to save the system. Here Ms. Lagarde notes we must build on what works, change what 
does not, and continually evolve, improve, and imagine a better future for all people.249 Calling 
for new creativity to “Reimagine International Cooperation” she emphasized US leadership is 
fundamental to meeting future challenges which require adaptation and reform once more, 
                                                          
244The right to development in practice: provisional lessons learned 2013,  High-level task force on the 
implementation of the right to development,  page 469   in “Realizing the Right to Development - Essays in 
Commemoration of 25 Years of the United Nations Declaration on the Right to Development”, HR/PUB/12/4 
UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATION at  
245 The Fourth Industrial Revolution: what it means, how to respond at: 
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/01/the-fourth-industrial-revolution-what-it-means-and-how-to-respond/  
“The First Industrial Revolution used water and steam power to mechanize production. The Second used electric 
power to create mass production. The Third used electronics and information technology to automate production. 
Now a Fourth Industrial Revolution is building on the Third, the digital revolution that has been occurring since the 
middle of the last century. It is characterized by a fusion of technologies that is blurring the lines between the 
physical, digital, and biological spheres.” 
246Poverty, the World Bank at:  https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/poverty/overview  
247 Christine Lagarde, 2018, Age of Ingenuity: Reimagining 21st Century International Cooperation Eighth Henry A. 
Kissinger Lecture — Library of Congress Christine Lagarde — Managing Director — International Monetary Fund 
Washington, DC https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2018/12/04/sp120418-md-kissinger-speech  
248 The Guardian - Keynes helped us through the crisis – but he's still out of favour, at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/economics-blog/2016/feb/07/keynes-helped-us-through-the-crisis-but-
hes-still-out-of-favour   
249 Idem note 247 [Christine Lagarde]  
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building on the lesson that “Solidarity is self-interest”.250 UNSG Guterres guides us toward a new 
generation of partnerships and dialogue with  governments, international organizations, the 
private sector and academia as instruments to catalyze a fantastic increase in the well-being of 
people. 251 The United Nations as a multi-lateral institution in current reform252 is still in good 
stead at global level to facilitate such partnerships and dialogue,253 as member States are still 
committed to the UN regardless of whether it started as a Westphalian-based phenomenon or 
not.254 Nevertheless, the type of new Dialogue of Civilisations, Dao or other agreed formulae 
needs to begin in earnest and urgently. The proven brilliance of the philosophies, ideas and 
approaches of Westphalian neo-liberalism need to create space for the brilliance of China, Russia 
and G77 States to also be considered  and  ensemble to evolve approaches to unblock the 
protracted legal and ideological debate on RTD and the economics that are essential for its 
realization.255 This applies equally to NIEO as it does to RTD, to Corporate Social Responsibility, 
climate change, and to a common and agreed approaches or set of approaches to human rights, 
and their universally and indivisibility. Different contexts with strengths and weaknesses require 
varied approaches, correctly adapting financial and economic models   to best respond to the 
human rights, development needs and wellbeing of people. As Kilby notes, the bringing together 
of all major world actors around the table as equal partners is THE challenge ahead where local 
sovereignty is fully considered when seeking to apply what are the globally accepted human 
                                                          
250 Idem note 247 [Christine Lagarde] 
251 Secretary General António Guterres, Remarks at the special session on "Cooperation for Peace: Tackling the 
Root Causes of Global Crises" at https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2017-01-19/secretary-generals-
cooperation-peace-remarks; Indeed, a common theme of many authors cited in this study is the need for more 
and better Dialogue, or a “Dialogue of Civilisations”, as the most important ingredient toward cooperation and 
shared action for a common future based on improving human wellbeing.    
252 United to Reform at https://reform.un.org/content/development-reform  
253 Christian Kreuder-Sonnen and Bernhard Zangl, 2015,Which Post-Westphalia? International organizations 
between constitutionalism and authoritarianism,  European Journal of International Relations2 015, Vol. 21(3) 
568–594DOI:10.1177/1354066114548736 at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/280207607_Which_Post-
Westphalia_International_Organizations_between_Constitutionalism_and_Authoritarianism  
254 Polly J. Diven John Constantelos, August 2011, The Domestic Foundations of Confidence in the United Nations, 
International Journal of Peace Studies 4(4 2) at: 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/305462768_The_Domestic_Foundations_of_Confidence_in_the_Unite
d_Nations  
255  Idem note 238 [Ling] at page 566 and Conclusion. Otherwise, “it will find itself left out of a major “mainstream” 
social relationship, despite its economic, political, or even military asymmetries.   
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rights and other global norms in those [specific] contexts.256  In this endevour, it is essential that 
the United States and China provide the leadership and be supported to find the formula for 
global cooperation to implement RTD needed to end extreme poverty, fight inequality and 
injustice, and protect our planet. Time is of the essence.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
256 Idem note 125 [Patrick Kilby 2017] at pages 24-37   
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